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Security Council

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Letter dated 1 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that under the presidency of Japan, the Security Council plans to hold an open debate at the ministerial level on the theme "Peacebuilding in Africa", under the agenda item "Peacebuilding and sustaining peace", on Thursday, 28 July 2016.

In order to help guide the debate, Japan has prepared a concept note (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Koro **Bessho**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 1 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Open debate of the Security Council
"Peacebuilding in Africa"
July
Concept note

1 July 2016

Background — what makes peace sustainable?

1. The idea of peacebuilding has been advocated to fill a "gaping hole" that post-conflict countries are prone to fall into, as pointed out in the Annan Report in 2005.[1] Many challenges need to be tackled to prevent a relapse into conflict and achieve sustaining peace in post-conflict countries and societies. It is a complex task involving a large number of parties. At the same time, resources directed towards peacebuilding are relatively limited in reality. Therefore, it is important to draw lessons learned from past experiences, to clarify priorities and to develop efficient support systems. Efforts have been made at the United Nations by establishing the Peacebuilding Commission, holding open debates at the Security Council and issuing presidential statements.[2]

2. The report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict,[3] in 2012, refers to "institution-building" as the core of peacebuilding and a priority in producing more resilient States and societies. If the institutions supporting peace and national order are weak or not operating properly, many underlying social hostilities cannot be resolved and the risk of such hostilities rising to the surface tends to increase. It is clear that unless the institutions of each sector are established and the trust of the people is gained, States cannot play their expected role of sustaining peace.

3. In 2015, the Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission deepened consideration of the extension of State authority and the building of political institutions. Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) and General Assembly resolution 70/262, both of which were adopted on 27 April 2016, identified sharing good practices of peacebuilding, including on institution-building, as one of the important roles of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Purpose of the open debate — why talk about Africa?

1. In recent years, many countries in Africa have gained peace and stability and are achieving rapid growth. On the other hand, some countries in the region still face serious challenges toward peacebuilding, for example, intertribal or religious conflict and various issues of socioeconomic development such as high

[1] A/59/2005.
[2] See S/PRST/2010/7, S/PRST/2011/2, S/PRST/2012/29.
[3] A/67/499-S/2012/746.

unemployment rates, poverty, inequality and lack of basic social services. The Security Council deals with various challenges relating to peace and security in Africa every day. Within Africa, some countries tend to suffer more from relapsed or prolonged conflicts and disasters, while the others demonstrate solid economic development. The situations and challenges in Africa are very diverse.

2. This open debate aims to identify the lessons learned and the existing challenges associated with peacebuilding in Africa by sharing experiences and best practices, and to discuss how the international community can support Africa's peacebuilding efforts more effectively and efficiently.

3. Supporting institution-building efforts while calling for greater national ownership by the countries concerned will help lay the foundations for conflict prevention. We expect more effective measures could be found by examining the root causes of lack of resilience and vulnerability from the viewpoint of institution-building and exploring the reasons why some countries are stable while others tend to face recurrent outbreaks or relapses of conflict.

Context — what are the challenges in building institutions?

1. It is assumed that efforts on the following challenges could contribute to peacebuilding in Africa by promoting the restoration and enhancement of national governance based on trust between the State and its citizen. There are many African countries that have already successfully overcome these challenges.

2. It is also necessary to take note of the interlinkages among these challenges as well as the overall national development plan of State-building in relation to institution-building.

1. *Democracy*

Challenges:

- Establishment of electoral systems, including voter registration, ensuring public trust and correcting flaws of institutional operation.
- Guarantee of freedom of the press and expression, including political criticism.
- Building of institutions to eliminate or mitigate potential post-electoral political confrontation among leaders.

2. *National security and law and order*

Challenges:

- Building the capacity of military and police to maintain security and law and order for the communities and combat violent extremism.
- Addressing issues of weak civilian control and correcting disobedience among military and police.
- Addressing issues of impunity and corruption.
- Establishment of a credible justice system that can provide fair judgments to citizens and does not allow intolerance to the opposition.

3. *Local governance*

Challenges:

- Improved coordination between central and local governance and enhanced national integrity.
- Strengthening local administrative systems, including the provision of services from the capital to rural areas and equitable wealth distribution.
- Establishment of border security systems to effectively monitor the flow of people, goods and weapons.

4. *Public administration management system*

Challenges:

- Building the capacity of the civil service in order to achieve proper public administration of residential registration, land tenure, etc.
- Building institutions of law enforcement and public administration to fully fulfil their duties and responsibilities.

5. *Economic and financial structure*

Challenges:

- Establishment of a taxation system to collect domestic revenue for development and self-reliant State administration.
- Institutionalized budget-making processes (formulation, consultation, decision and account settlement), as well as trust in the fair distribution of national budgets.
- Strengthening measures for cooperation with the private sector, industrial development and job creation.

6. *Basic social service system*

Challenges:

- Establishment of basic social services such as water supply and sewerage, garbage collection and public transportation in urban areas.
- Strengthening social systems for education and medical and public health to address epidemic crises such as the Ebola outbreak.

7. *System for dialogue and reconciliation*

Challenges:

- Establishment of opportunity to promote intercommunal dialogue and information-sharing where intertribal and interreligious conflicts exist or are recurring.

Questions for debate

1. What are the high-priority issues that need to be addressed in order to prevent the recurrence of conflicts and to sustain peace in Africa? What are Africa's unique features that we need to take into account when we address these priority issues?

2. What are the examples of successful or failed institution-building efforts (or similar examples seen in supporting other countries)? What are the causes of success or failure?

3. How can we efficiently mobilize and utilize the capacities of existing missions and entities such as Peacekeeping Operations, special political missions, the Peacebuilding Commission and other United Nations agencies and systems (e.g., United Nations country teams, etc.) in the area of institution-building?

4. What are the roles of regional organizations such as the African Union and subregional organizations such as the African Regional Economic Communities in the context of institution-building?

5. What are the roles of women, youth and civil society in efforts towards institution-building in Africa? How can we support in a comprehensive manner Africa's institutional-building efforts (e.g., the use of science technology, human resource development, etc.)?

Meeting format

This open debate will be held at the ministerial level on 28 July 2016, at 10 a.m., in the Security Council Chamber, and will be open to all Member States.

Briefers

1. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations (*to be confirmed*)

2. Ambassador Amina Mohamed, Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya (*to be confirmed*)

3. Ambassador Smail Chergui, African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security (*to be confirmed*)

Outcome

The President will engage with Security Council members with the view of adopting a presidential statement on the same day.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2228 (2015), by which the Council extended the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2016 and requested me to report every 90 days on the implementation of the mission's mandate. In addition to the special report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2016/510), which provides a conflict analysis, an update on the political situation and a recommendation for mandate renewal, the present report covers events in Darfur since the date of publication of my previous report (S/2015/1027), from 22 March until 15 June 2016. It presents the achievements of UNAMID in implementing its strategic priorities, endorsed by the Council in resolutions 2148 (2014), 2173 (2014) and 2228 (2015), and in achieving its revised benchmarks (see S/2014/279 and resolution 2228 (2015)). It also highlights the main challenges to effective mandate implementation, the transfer of tasks to the United Nations country team and the exit strategy.

II. Security situation

Fighting between government forces and rebel groups

2. Fighting between government forces and Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) elements continued in parts of the Jebel Marra throughout the reporting period. Clashes were reported in areas north-east of Nertiti, Central Darfur, on 22 and 23 March and 1 and 4 April, with government forces allegedly attacking the villages of Kwila, Kadingo, Koron, Solow, Hilat Tusug, Boringakari and Mari. Aerial bombardments were also reported in the area, including in Jokosti, Miela, and Daginja around Golo between 4 and 18 March and Sarrong between 17 March and 9 April. The Government also launched air strikes south-east of Nertiti in the villages of Galol, Jaro, Dirma and Dirsa on 23 March, as a result of which two children were reportedly injured.

3. In the vicinity of Golo, east of Nertiti, SLA/AW elements ambushed a convoy of the Sudanese Armed Forces on 4 April. The Government responded with aerial bombardments in Golo and Guldo on 8 and 9 April, while its forces attacked Togay

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and other villages south-west of Guldo and west of Golo. To the north-east of Golo, the attack by government forces against the local population in Rockero on 8 and 9 April reportedly resulted in 90 casualties. According to local sources, the Sudanese Armed Forces and Military Intelligence prevented civilians from fleeing the fighting in Guldo and Nertiti. On 8 April, government forces reportedly captured Sarrong, south of Golo, but on 9 April, SLA/AW allegedly attacked a convoy of border guards near Golo.

4. In Golol, south-east of Nertiti, fighting between government forces and SLA/AW was reported on 28 April. On 7 May, the Government reportedly dropped 18 bombs there, followed by clashes with SLA/AW forces on 8 May. On 10 May, UNAMID personnel in Nertiti witnessed government aircraft flying over the Jebel Marra and subsequently heard explosions in the mountain area.

5. On 29 and 30 May, a government aircraft reportedly dropped several bombs in Kutrum, east of Nertiti, after which SLA/AW forces allegedly attacked a Sudanese Armed Forces position in the area on 30 May. A total of 9 SLA/AW members and 12 Sudanese soldiers were reportedly killed in the clash. On 5 June, UNAMID received further reports from local sources of aerial bombardments and fighting in Kutrum, as a result of which 10 civilians were killed.

6. In South Darfur, on 21 April, UNAMID was informed by local sources that government forces had attacked Feina and surrounding areas near Kass on 15 March and killed 42 civilians.

7. With respect to other rebel movements, much as in previous reporting periods, there was no report of military engagement involving government forces and the Justice and Equality Movement. On 21 April, the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minnawi (SLA/MM) faction claimed that it had repulsed an attack by government forces in Wadi Maghreb, North Darfur.

Local conflicts and intercommunal violence

8. The security situation in East Darfur deteriorated in April with a series of incidents, including two attacks against its governor, by Southern Rezeigat militias. Following the theft of camels by Southern Rezeigat from Ma'alia in the village of Tortahan on 15 April, Rezeigat attacked Ma'alia community leaders on 17 April who had gathered at a police station to discuss the issue. In the exchange of fire, seven Ma'alia, four government security personnel and nine Rezeigat were killed. The following day, Rezeigat attacked the residence of the governor in Ed Daein, who was absent at the time, and four of his guards and two assailants were killed in the ensuing firefight. Sudanese Armed Forces reinforcements were deployed to contain the situation. On 25 April, the governor's residence was attacked again, and a civilian was killed. The Government established a panel to investigate the incidents, but, on 11 May, an attempt by government security forces to arrest an individual allegedly involved in the attack against the governor reportedly led to a heavy exchange of gunfire and the withdrawal of the government forces.

9. The flight of internally displaced persons from the Jebel Marra also changed the local dynamics. In Sortony, North Darfur, Northern Rezeigat carried out a series of attacks from 2 to 15 May against the internally displaced persons who had arrived recently from the Jebel Marra, accusing them of stealing their cattle and of being affiliated with SLA/AW. On 9 May, Rezeigat raided the camp for internally

displaced persons in Sortony, killing six internally displaced persons and injuring six others, including a UNAMID peacekeeper. UNAMID apprehended two of the assailants, who were handed over to the government authorities.

10. In West Darfur, tensions between Northern Rezeigat and Massalit originating in disputes over *diya* (blood money) culminated into an exchange of fire in Azerni on 22 May, which claimed 10 lives, including that of a Sudanese soldier. The government offices in El Geneina, including those of the State Governor (*Wali*), were closed until military and police forces were deployed to contain the situation.

11. UNAMID recorded six other clashes, which resulted in 36 fatalities. In West Darfur, a dispute over land between Massalit and Dago on 21 April resulted in the death of a Dago. In North Darfur, a clash between an unidentified armed group and cattle herders between 24 and 25 April claimed 28 lives in total, and Massalit attacked Northern Rezeigat near Sereif and killed two of them in an armed robbery. In East Darfur, a fight over cattle between Habaniya and Rezeigat on 23 April resulted in the death of two Habaniya, disputes over access to farmland between Ma'alia and Zaghawa led to the death of a Zaghawa on 7 April, and a clash over farmland between Birgid and Rezeigat resulted in the death of three Rezeigat and two Birgid between 28 and 29 April.

Crime and banditry

12. A total of 786 criminal incidents and 179 casualities were recorded during the reporting period, in an increase from 505 incidents and 126 casualties in the previous period. The most common crimes were armed robbery (123 cases), attempted robbery (26 cases), assault/harassment (251 cases), burglary/break-ins (48 cases), looting (18 cases), abduction (40 cases), arson (9 cases), shooting (131 cases), attack/ambush (34 cases), threat (44 cases), livestock theft (40 cases) and others (22 cases).

13. Attacks on internally displaced persons and civilians by armed nomads, militia groups and other criminal elements increased during the reporting period, resulting in 281 civilian fatalities compared with 97 in the previous period. The upsurge in violence has been a continuous trend since the previous period and is attributable to the role of armed militias in the ongoing military campaign in the Jebel Marra.

14. In Central Darfur, armed militias entered and began shooting in the Thur East and Hassahisa internally displaced persons camps on 30 April and 9 May, respectively, injuring an internally displaced person in each case. Shots were fired in the vicinity of the Khamsadagaig, Habad East and Straina internally displaced persons camps on 9 April, 29 March and 19 May, respectively. In South Darfur, unidentified assailants opened fire in the Kalma internally displaced persons camp on 30 April and 7 and 11 May, which resulted in an injury.

15. In North Darfur, an armed group reportedly attacked a village near Sortony on 25 March, burning houses and killing an undetermined number of civilians. In addition, on 20 May, some 50 armed Arab nomads raided the village of Sigilli, firing randomly. Internally displaced persons were also killed in other criminal incidents, including in Mujajeria, Al Neem, East Darfur; Kalma, Al Salam camp, Dereige and Kass, South Darfur; and Tawilla, North Darfur.

16. Incidents of assault and harassment of internally displaced persons and civilians also increased from 110 during the previous reporting period to 127 in the

period under review. In addition, internally displaced persons were arrested by the government authorities without specific charges. On 15 May, Military Intelligence arrested two internally displaced persons in Kass, South Darfur, including a secretary-general of the internally displaced persons leadership committee, for unknown reasons. On 23 May, the National Intelligence and Security Services detained a sheikh from the Thur camp, Central Darfur, whose whereabouts remain unknown. Seven other sheikhs remain missing. On the same day, another internally displaced person from the Kalma camp, South Darfur, was arrested by Military Intelligence in Nyala. On 29 May, a resident of the Thur camp, South Darfur, was also arrested by the National Intelligence and Security Services and Military Intelligence.

17. During the reporting period, there were also several attacks against government installations by armed militias. In Central Darfur, a police station in Bindisi was attacked on 8 April by some 150 armed Arabs from the Nawaiba clan in retaliation for one of its members having been killed the day before while attempting to free another member from detention. In South Darfur, on 27 April, militias associated with the Rapid Support Forces exchanged fire with the police in Nyala, and a civilian was injured by a stray bullet. In North Darfur, on 3 June, unidentified armed men attacked a police station in Saraf Umra and freed five detainees. In West Darfur, on 16 May, during a meeting to discuss the killing of Arab men near a Sudanese Armed Forces base, Arab nomads held hostage for several hours the locality commissioner, commanders of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudanese police, and members of the security committee in Habila.

III. Political developments

18. The national dialogue was launched on 10 October 2015, notwithstanding a boycott by many opposition parties and armed movements. The dialogue deliberations were concluded through six committees dealing with peace and unity, the economy, the governance and implementation of the outcome of the dialogue, external relations, identity and culture and freedom and basic rights. Some of the recommendations reportedly included the establishment of a four-year national reconciliation government and a constitutional review. On 9 May, the committees announced that their reports were ready for submission to the President, but a date is yet to be announced for the consideration of their recommendations.

19. Consultations between the Government and non-signatory armed movements continued, without yielding an agreed-upon outcome. From 18 to 21 March, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel convened a meeting between the Government and members of the Sudan Call coalition in Addis Ababa with a view to reaching a cessation of hostilities agreement and a consensus on the way forward on the national dialogue. During the meeting, the Government signed a road map agreement presented by the Panel which, among others, called for a meeting between the coordination body known as the Higher Coordinative Committee for National Dialogue and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, together with other opposition parties, to consider steps that should be taken to achieve inclusivity in the dialogue. The opposition refused to sign it, however. On 21 April, the Sudan Call coalition held a meeting in Paris and reaffirmed its opposition to the road map, while declaring an extension for an additional six months of its unilateral cessation of hostilities, initially declared in September 2015, and calling upon the

Panel to facilitate a meeting with the Government to implement the cessation of hostilities.

20. A referendum to determine the administrative status of Darfur, in accordance with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur between the Government and the Liberation and Justice Movement, was held from 11 to 13 April, as scheduled. Non-signatory movements and the majority of internally displaced persons continued to reject the referendum. Peaceful demonstrations against the referendum was held in internally displaced person camps in Sortony, North Darfur, on 25 March; Kalma, South Darfur, from 2 to 5 April; and Hamidiya, Hassahisa and Khamsadagaig, Central Darfur, on 10 and 11 April. Students staged a peaceful demonstration in front of El Fasher University on 11 April and were dispersed by the Sudanese police.

21. Voting proceeded without major incidents, except for the assault and injury by the police of a representative of the Darfur Regional Administration who reported witnessing irregularities in East Darfur. The League of Arab States, the African Union and some Member States deployed observers. On 24 April, the Darfur Referendum Commission announced that 90.7 per cent of registered voters had turned out to cast a ballot, and 97.72 per cent of them had voted for administering Darfur through the current five-state system rather than reverting to the status of Darfur as a single region.

22. On 13 June, the Government announced the dissolution of the Darfur Regional Authority, the term of which had been extended by presidential decree until July 2016, following its expiration in 2015, as provided for in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. This follows, according to the Government, the implementation of most of the provisions of the Doha Document, including the Darfur administrative referendum in April. In its announcement, the Government reiterated its previous position that the commissions and funds established under the Doha Document would continue to function under the authority of the presidency to ensure the full implementation of outstanding issues, such as the work of the Darfur Land Commission. The Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur and the Implementation Follow-up Commission of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, headed by Qatar, would also be retained.

IV. Humanitarian situation

23. Displacements caused by the ongoing military action in the Jebel Marra area continued to generate significant humanitarian needs in North, Central and South Darfur. The influx of South Sudanese into East and South Darfur also required a humanitarian response. In Darfur, humanitarian partners had verified, as at the beginning of June, that some 80,000 people had fled from the Jebel Marra. In addition, there have been unconfirmed reports of up to 127,000 additional people being displaced. That number has not yet been verified by humanitarian partners, owing to lack of access.

Jebel Marra

24. In North Darfur, the humanitarian response continued to focus on some 58,000 internally displaced persons gathered at Sortony, Tawilla, Kabkabiya and Shangil Tobaya. In Central Darfur, limited access allowed international humanitarian

partners to register only 4,295 new internally displaced persons at the Hassahisa and Hameedia camps. The Sudanese authorities meanwhile reported that an additional 58,000 people had been displaced in Nertiti, Thur, Guldo and Golo. Unconfirmed reports continued to indicate that up to 53,000 people had been displaced in other locations, including Boori and the Wadi Boori area, the villages of Daya and Fanga Suk, the town of Rockero and the Thur East camp. Verification of these figures has not been possible, owing to movement restrictions.

25. In April, the Government reportedly conducted assessments in North and Central Darfur. International humanitarian partners were not involved in the exercise, and its findings have not yet been made available. On 30 May, the Government presented a plan to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons to the Jebel Marra and reported that 11,500 people had returned from Guldo to Golo, to their villages, and been provided with some food and non-food items. Humanitarian actors have approached the Government to discuss the plan and opportunities to support it in a coordinated manner and in line with humanitarian principles, including dignity, safety and voluntary return.

26. In April, for the first time since the beginning of the ongoing military operation in the Jebel Marra, the World Food Programme (WFP) obtained access to conduct, through partners, general food distribution to 14,000 newly internally displaced persons at Thur, Guldo and Nertiti. However, independent needs assessments have not been carried out owing to the lack of clearance.

27. In South Darfur, 18,000 internally displaced persons have been verified at the town of Kass, the Otash camp, the villages of Mershing and Menawashi, the town of El Malam and the village of Deribat, with a further estimated 10,000 yet to be verified. Humanitarian partners currently have access to all locations of displacement except Deribat and the surroundings of Kass, to which they still do not have access, despite having repeatedly requested it since the beginning of the crisis.

Influx of South Sudanese

28. Since the previous reporting period, there has been an additional influx of more than 10,000 South Sudanese refugees into East and South Darfur, who are mainly driven by hunger caused by the conflict in South Sudan, bringing the total number of refugee arrivals in 2016 to 52,000. Since the beginning of the year, more than 5,000 people have been registered at the Bielel camp in South Darfur. In East Darfur, some 29,000 people have arrived at the Khor Omer camp in Ed Daein, while an additional 17,500 have reportedly arrived at another seven localities.

V. Operating environment

Attacks against, restrictions of movement of, and denial of access for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

29. UNAMID personnel and property continued to be targeted by individual perpetrators and armed criminal elements. A total of 60 criminal incidents, comprising 21 incidents of break-ins, burglary and theft, 3 incidents of threats, 3 assaults, 3 robberies and 2 incidents of attempted theft, 2 shooting incidents, 4 carjacking incidents, 1 abduction of a UNAMID truck driver, 16 incidents of stone-throwing at UNAMID vehicles, 1 incident of an attack against the team site of

UNAMID and 4 incidents of damage to the assets and properties of the United Nations, were recorded, in comparison with 21 incidents in the previous reporting period.

30. The Sudanese security agencies, most notably the National Intelligence and Security Services and Military Intelligence, restricted patrols and flights by UNAMID especially those relating to the Jebel Marra, on multiple occasions, citing insecurity or lack of prior authorization. From 4 to 14 April, the National Intelligence and Security Services in Nertiti, Central Darfur, stopped all movements of UNAMID, except for water collection, citing security reasons. They allowed logistical convoys and water collection patrols to resume on 14 April, while all others remained suspended. On 27 April, the Services in Zalengei, Central Darfur, refused clearance for a UNAMID mission to Guldo, Golo and Sarrong, scheduled to be conducted from 27 April to 1 May. In West Darfur, a UNAMID patrol outside El Geneina was prevented from interacting with community members by the Services on 29 March; a UNAMID training activity at the Rongates camp was stopped by the Sudanese police on 4 May; and a UNAMID patrol out of El Geneina was denied access by Military Intelligence on 17 May, and again by the Sudanese Armed Forces on 1 June. In South Darfur, a UNAMID assessment mission with two local partners was stopped by the Services claiming that non-UNAMID personnel did not have security clearance on 10 May. In North Darfur, a patrol of UNAMID from Sortony to Rockero was stopped at the military checkpoint on 15 June — no particular reason was provided.

31. UNAMID also continued to experience flight restrictions. During the reporting period, 68 sorties, or 29 regularly scheduled flights to 18 destinations, were cancelled owing to the lack of clearance by the authorities. These included repeated cancellations of flights to Sortony, North Darfur, on 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 23, 26, 27 and 30 April and 1, 3, 4, 7 and 12 May.

Attacks against United Nations agencies, international non-governmental organizations and humanitarian personnel

32. The number of attacks against United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations continued to decline, from three in the previous reporting period to two during the period under review. On 27 March, a national staff member of WFP was robbed in Nyala, South Darfur, and on 5 April, three local staff members of an international non-governmental organization were robbed near El Geneina, West Darfur.

Denial of access for and restrictions imposed on humanitarian actors

33. Humanitarian organizations regularly reported having encountered challenges in their humanitarian action and protection activities owing to access restrictions, interference with programme administration and implementation by the authorities and the impact of ongoing hostilities and incidents of violence and intimidation.

34. Inter-agency and/or other independent needs assessments relating to displacement in the Jebel Marra have not been permitted by the Government in a number of areas of reported displacement, in particular Central Darfur. In East Darfur, an inter-agency mission to assess the situation of the South Sudanese refugees in several locations was denied clearance three times, before it was finally conducted from 10 to 11 May.

35. In May, the Government issued new directives, including a reduction in the duration of travel permits from one year to six months, the suspension of expedited customs procedures for humanitarian goods and additional restrictions on the dissemination of humanitarian information. These actions run contrary to international norms and humanitarian standards and, if implemented, would inhibit the international community's ability to implement its response.

Visas and customs clearance

36. During the reporting period, the Government rejected 6 visa requests, compared with 5 in the previous reporting period, while 992 were approved, the majority of which were for police personnel. On 24 February, UNAMID submitted a list of 29 priority visa requests from the 97 requests rejected in 2015, and, thus far, 20 of the 29 have been approved. As at 15 June, 57 visa requests remained pending from those submitted in 2016. The number of visas issued to substantive personnel in the protection of civilians and humanitarian liaison sections in 2016 increased. In May, the Sudanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs indicated it would not renew the residence permit of the Head of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Sudan, resulting in his de facto expulsion.

37. Following the third technical-level meeting with the Government of the Sudan, on 15 June, 106 ration shipments consisting of 142 containers were cleared for release from Port Sudan. Meanwhile, 314 shipments of United Nations-owned equipment and contingent-owned equipment, some of which have been there since April 2015, remain in Port Sudan and Khartoum, pending customs approval. Those shipments contain military and police assets, such as armoured personnel carriers, vehicles, spare parts and self-sustainment supplies, and the resulting shortages have not only severely hampered the ability of UNAMID troops to communicate, conduct robust patrols and protect civilians, but also resulted in demurrage charges and additional costs for the troop- and police-contributing countries to inspect and repair their equipment.

VI. Mandate implementation

A. Support for an inclusive peace process

High-level mediation

38. On 15 and 16 April, the Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator met with the leadership of the Justice and Equality Movement/Gibril faction (JEM/Gibril) and SLA/MM in Addis Ababa, who expressed their readiness for further discussions with the Government, facilitated by UNAMID and Qatar. The two groups held further consultations with the Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar and UNAMID in Doha on 30 and 31 May to discuss issues relating to the peace process, including their concerns with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The SLA/AW representative remained outside of the process, despite indicating to the Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator his intention to participate in consultations scheduled for 12 to 14 June in Geneva, to discuss the Doha Document.

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

39. The eleventh meeting of the Implementation Follow-up Commission of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur was held in Khartoum on 9 May. As the tenure of the Darfur Regional Authority was to expire in July, the Government indicated that several commissions and funding structures created under the Doha Document would continue under a new mechanism, placed under the presidency, to ensure the full implementation of pending issues. It was also agreed that the Commission would continue to monitor the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Doha Document.

40. Further to the release of 6.4 million Sudanese pounds, equivalent to $1 million, or 50 per cent of the pledge made by the Government for the second phase of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation in February, the Government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signed an agreement on 16 March for the latter to manage the funds. The Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation Implementation Committee, in collaboration with UNAMID, began preparing for the holding of consultations in 26 localities in Darfur.

41. From 18 April to 9 May, in El Fasher, UNAMID supported the demobilization of 779 ex-combatants from the Liberation and Justice Movement and Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan and from the outstanding caseload from the Darfur Peace Agreement. Community-based reintegration began for 700 ex-combatants, with the support of UNDP and funding from Qatar.

42. In addition, UNAMID, in collaboration with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Darfur Regional Authority, held conferences on the control of small arms and light weapons in El Fasher on 18 and 19 April and in El Geneina on 6 and 7 March. Discussions focused on the way forward for the reduction of the number of weapons held by civilians and gun safety measures through the proposed establishment of an arms registration and marking process in communities across Darfur. UNAMID donated gun-marking machines, compressors and gun lockers to the Commission in West Darfur and provided technical and logistical support.

B. Protection of civilians

Provision of physical protection

43. In accordance with its strategy for the protection of civilians, UNAMID focused on providing targeted responses to civilians under threat by increasing synergy within the mission and with humanitarian partners and fostering interaction with local community members to inform patrol planning and execution at the team site level. Despite those efforts, civilians, in particular women and children, remained vulnerable to attacks, especially while undertaking livelihood activities such as farming and collecting firewood. UNAMID continued to explore ways to address those specific protection issues.

44. UNAMID conducted 23,360 patrols, as compared with 19,417 in the previous reporting period, comprising 8,090 routine patrols, 9,620 short-range patrols, 480 long-range patrols, 2,654 night patrols, 576 humanitarian escorts and 1,941 logistics and administrative escorts covering 7,364 villages and 3,024 camps for internally displaced persons.

45. UNAMID police personnel conducted 8,706 patrols as compared with 8,741 patrols in the same period in 2015, comprising 4,672 confidence-building patrols to camps for internally displaced persons and 4,034 patrols to protect women and children engaged in livelihood activities outside such camps, including market, village, town, areas of return and commercial routes patrols. Those efforts resulted in 777 criminal cases being reported to UNAMID (compared with 574 cases reported in the same period in 2015), which resulted in 178 arrests by the Sudanese police.

46. In response to the influx of internally displaced persons from the Jebel Marra at its team site in Sortony, North Darfur, UNAMID continued to conduct day and night patrols inside and outside the camp and to establish static positions inside the camp to monitor the situation. A protection network committee and an integrated field protection team have been established to strengthen coordination, dialogue, early warning and timely response to protection threats.

47. UNAMID continued to support the clearance of explosive remnants of war and conducted general hazard assessments in 22 villages, primarily in North and South Darfur. UNAMID located and destroyed 1,297 items of unexploded ordnance, including a 500-lb aircraft-delivered bomb in Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur, and 146 rounds of small arms ammunition. UNAMID reached 92,285 beneficiaries with 1,184 risk education sessions on explosive remnants of war in areas identified as high priority, owing to their level of contamination and accident reporting, as well as areas where internally displaced persons were arriving from the Jebel Marra. In addition, UNAMID, with a view to promoting safe practices in weapons and ammunition safety in selected police stations, initiated 13 projects for the refurbishment of basic weapons and ammunition storage facilities in Ed Daein, Nyala and El Geneina.

Logistic and security support to humanitarian operations

48. During the reporting period, UNAMID military personnel provided 411 round-trip escorts for humanitarian partners undertaking the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the monitoring of the humanitarian and protection situation, the majority of which were carried out in North Darfur. In addition, UNAMID formed police units provided 73 humanitarian escorts, mainly in North and South Darfur, including for the delivery of food and non-food items to Kutum, Kabkabiya, Sortony, El Sireaf, Tawilla and Korma in North Darfur.

49. UNAMID provided escorts two to three times per week for humanitarian convoys between Kabkabiya and Sortony, in addition to providing daily escorts for water trucks from Kobe to Sortony. In support of humanitarian partners, UNAMID also dug a borehole and provided four tankers and generators for water trucking and pumping at a water point near Sotorny and is digging three more boreholes. With the logistical support of UNAMID for the rehabilitation of the helipad, the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service launched twice-weekly flights between El Fasher and Sortony on 29 May.

Promoting a protective environment

50. The human rights situation remained volatile and unpredictable, with continued clashes in the Jebel Marra making communities in the area vulnerable. Attacks against civilians worsened on account of the alleged complicity of the

Sudanese security forces and the perceived lack of police interest in apprehending perpetrators. Women and girls continued to be exposed to sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence.

51. During the reporting period, UNAMID documented 120 new incidents of human rights violations and abuses, involving 387 victims (including 27 children), compared with 132 such incidents involving 338 victims during the previous period. The violation of the right to life accounted for 27 cases, involving 130 victims; the right to physical integrity accounted for 41 cases, involving 108 victims; sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence in the form of rape, accounted for 24 cases, involving 61 victims (including 16 children); and the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and illegal detention accounted for 14 cases, involving 60 victims. There were 14 cases of abduction, involving 28 victims. In 44 cases, involving 161 victims, assailants were identified as government security forces and allied groups. The remaining 76 cases, involving 226 victims, were perpetrated by unidentified armed men.

52. Of these reports, UNAMID confirmed the occurrence of 74 cases of human rights violations and abuses through field missions, visits to camps for internally displaced persons and trial monitoring. The remaining 46 cases could not be verified, owing in part to movement restrictions imposed by the Government. Access issues, relating in particular to the Jebel Marra, were also attributable to the fall in the number of reported cases and prevented UNAMID from interacting with displaced persons and host communities. Such interaction is critical for interviewing victims and witnesses and documenting human rights incidents. For example, internally displaced persons at the North camp, Central Darfur, reported on 18 April that they had been instructed by the authorities not to release any information to UNAMID. Moreover, civil society groups operating health-care centres were not allowed to deal with cases involving conflict-related, sexual and gender-based violence, especially in Central Darfur.

53. Widespread impunity remained a major challenge, aggravated by a capacity deficit on the part of State institutions, the absence of a security environment conducive to civilian safety across Darfur and excesses in the exercise of power by security forces. For example, on 24 March, a female student was intercepted on her way to the University of El Geneina by the National Intelligence and Security Services and assaulted. Similarly, seven students from Nyala University who were arrested on 26 April for demonstrating against the increase in public transport fees reported having been beaten in detention. In an encouraging development, on 10 May, a court in El Geneina, convicted and sentenced a 25-year-old man and Sudanese soldier to 20 years' imprisonment for the rape of a 7-year-old girl.

54. UNAMID carried out capacity-building initiatives for Sudanese police officers, including a training course on criminal investigation, English-language classes and a workshop on gender mainstreaming and sexual exploitation and abuse, in addition to training for community policing volunteers. As part of crime prevention initiatives in camps for internally displaced persons, 214 joint patrols were conducted with the involvement of 267 community policing volunteers. In addition, UNAMID held 150 awareness-raising sessions for internally displaced persons on sexual violence, safety and security issues, highlighting the importance of reporting criminal cases to the police and seeking medical treatment for the victims. A total of 254 visits were conducted to police stations and detention centres

to monitor the conditions of children in juvenile detention centres and those living with their mothers in such facilities. Five workshops on gender mainstreaming, sexual and gender-based violence and livelihood skills were conducted for 163 internally displaced persons (82 men and 81 women) in the north, south and east sectors.

55. In a positive development, the Supreme Court Division for Darfur States was inaugurated in Nyala on 13 April, following advocacy by UNAMID. The Division has already undertaken case reviews and released 512 prisoners from prisons in Darfur, many of whom were minor offenders or mothers accompanied by young children. Similarly, following advocacy and capacity-building support from UNAMID, the General Directorate for Prisons and Reform recruited 350 prison officers, 79 of them women, during the reporting period. In South Darfur, in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNAMID engaged the Ministry of Social Affairs, the peace and security department of the University of Nyala and other government ministries in a process that resulted in the release of 30 female inmates from Nyala prison, who then received livelihood support.

56. On 27 March, my Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict witnessed the signing of the action plan by the United Nations and Government on protecting children from violations during armed conflict, including through the cessation and prevention of child recruitment in Darfur and the Sudan at large. The visit also provided an opportunity to gain access to 21 children allegedly recruited by JEM/Gibril and captured during military operations in Darfur in April 2015. The United Nations Children's Fund and UNAMID continue to work with the Government to expedite the release of the children and their reunification with their families. In addition to those advocacy efforts, UNAMID provided capacity-building and training on child rights and child protection for 1,149 people (510 women and 639 men), including Sudanese police officers, prison workers, personnel from the Ministry of Social Affairs, community policing volunteers, internally displaced persons and community members.

57. In an effort to bolster dialogue and enhance the peace process, more than 130 women leaders benefited from a programme entitled "Darfur women talking peace", designed by UNAMID to discuss peace messages in communities, including in the women's prison in El Fasher on 20 and 21 April. In West Darfur, UNAMID, in collaboration with UNFPA, hosted 100 women in a discussion on the key concern of disparity between traditional laws and Sudanese law. UNAMID also trained members of civil society organizations on gender mainstreaming.

C. Local conflict mediation

58. UNAMID took measures to mitigate tensions between communities affected by incidents of intercommunal violence. In the aftermath of the attacks against internally displaced persons in Sortony, North Darfur, UNAMID initiated the reconciliation process between nomads and those displaced, including a meeting on 17 and 18 May between leaders of the Northern Rezeigat and Fur tribes in Sortony. UNAMID sought to facilitate the reopening of the road between Kabkabiya and Sortony, but Northern Rezeigat continued to refuse the proposal, demanding the release of two Rezeigat arrested for the attack against the camp in Sortony. In East

Darfur, following the incident at the village of Tortahan that led to attacks against its governor in April, UNAMID undertook intensive consultation efforts with Southern Rezeigat and Ma'alia communities to ease tensions and begin the reconciliation process.

59. In South Darfur, UNAMID continued to facilitate reconciliation between Salamat and Fallata, following their clashes in February, by supporting a peace conference held from 14 to 18 May by the Darfur Regional Authority and the state mediation committee. The two communities signed a revised peace agreement. In addition, UNAMID and native administrations conducted a peace conference in Graida on 17 and 18 May to ensure the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement signed in 2015 between the Fallata and Massalit. Participants recommended the formation of a joint peace committee to review land disputes.

60. In West Darfur, UNAMID held eight dialogue and consultation forums, from 11 to 25 May, with a view to preventing conflicts between farmers and nomadic herders in the forthcoming planting season. A total of 453 participants, representing farmers, nomadic communities, native and religious leaders, returnees, internally displaced persons and local authorities, took part in the process.

61. In North Darfur, UNAMID continued to engage with traditional leaders and local and state authorities from Berti and Zeyadiyah, urging them to hold their reconciliation conference.

VII. Transfer of mandated tasks and cooperation with the United Nations country team

62. The lack of sufficient funding and human resources for the United Nations country team continued to pose a challenge to the transfer of tasks. In the meantime, UNAMID has concluded its operations in several tasks relating to the rule of law, including support for legal aid, and is narrowing the geographical scope of its support for the criminal justice chain in areas to which internally displaced persons have returned or are likely to return. The joint programme developed by UNAMID and the country team for the rule of law in Darfur for the period from 2016 to 2019 is designed to enable the latter, pending donor support, to progressively assume many of the transferred tasks. UNAMID and the country team convened donor meetings jointly to mobilize funding for the programme in Khartoum on 24 April and 2 June.

VIII. Financial aspects

63. The General Assembly, by its resolution 69/261 B, appropriated the amount of $1,102.2 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. As at 13 June 2016, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAMID amounted to $253.3 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,232.9 million. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made for the period up to 30 April 2016, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 December 2015, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IX. Observations

64. While an estimated 2.6 million people remain displaced in Darfur, and fighting between government forces and SLA/AW in the Jebel Marra continues, the political process to agree on a framework for peace in Darfur is yet to be concluded. I commend and continue to support the efforts of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator and other partners to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict. I am concerned by the continued absence of SLA/AW from the negotiating table, and I urge them to participate constructively in the process. In our special report of 8 June (S/2016/510), the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and I called upon the broader Sudanese opposition to adhere to the road map agreement proposed by the Panel, which was signed by the Government in April. This would represent a considerable step towards ending the conflicts in the Sudan, enabling the provision of assistance to communities in need and enhancing the environment for a credible and inclusive national dialogue.

65. Continued access restrictions imposed by the Government in Central Darfur have prevented UNAMID and humanitarian partners from undertaking verification missions and assessment exercises. Consequently, the full scale of humanitarian and protection needs remains unknown, and thousands of affected civilians remain without assistance. I reiterate my call upon both the Government and SLA/AW to cease fighting to allow full and unhindered humanitarian access to the civilian population in all locations, including the Jebel Marra, and urge the Government to give priority to political negotiations, as agreed during the deliberations of the Joint Working Group. I remind all parties to the conflict that they have an obligation under international law to protect civilians and to allow unhindered access for humanitarian assistance.

66. I remain concerned that intercommunal violence continues to be a major source of insecurity for civilians. Recurrences of clashes, despite government interventions, as well as repeated attacks against internally displaced persons, illustrate the fluidity and fragility of local dynamics, which are exacerbated by the conflict. This highlights the need for concerted efforts to address the root causes of local tensions, especially regarding the management of land, water and other scarce resources, together with efforts to strengthen the rule of law and other dispute-resolution mechanisms without the use of force.

67. Given that the nature of the Darfur conflict remains largely unchanged, I reiterate the recommendations in the special report in which the Chairperson and I requested UNAMID to focus its mandate activities on the following: first, protecting internally displaced persons by prioritizing resources based on a mapping of displacement camps and potential areas of return; and, second, addressing intercommunal violence through the implementation of a mission-wide strategy based on prevention, mitigation and support for the resolution of the root causes of such violence. Concurrently, the uniformed components will take measures to enhance their overall flexibility through the reinforcement of troops at team sites of greater operational significance and the possible reduction or closure of others, the creation of a highly mobile reserve military capability and an increased field presence of police officers from within existing capabilities.

68. I welcome the progress made by the United Nations, the African Union and the Government to improve cooperation with respect to the operations of UNAMID, including in relation to its exit strategy. I count on the Government to fulfil its commitment regarding the removal of all bureaucratic impediments imposed on the personnel and assets of UNAMID. While the Government has taken steps to release some of the containers from Port Sudan, the delay in processing customs clearance for food supplies has not only put UNAMID uniformed personnel at risk, but has also led to troop- and police-contributing countries accruing demurrage charges. Furthermore, shipments containing equipment from the troop- and police-contributing countries remain held in Port Sudan, to the detriment of their operations and welfare. I once again urge the Government to uphold the UNAMID status-of-forces agreement.

69. In conclusion, I should like to thank the Joint Special Representative/Joint Chief Mediator, Martin Uhomoibhi, and all the women and men of UNAMID, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations who seek to improve the lives of the people of Darfur. I also commend my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios, and former Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Abdulsalami Abubakar, of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, for their efforts to resolve the conflicts in the Sudan.



Map No. 4827 Rev. 29 UNITED NATIONS
Jun 2016 (Colour)

Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

United Nations S/2016/588

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 July 2016
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 1 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, and further to our previous letters regarding the attacks carried out by the so-called international coalition against civilians, infrastructure and economic installations in the Syrian Arab Republic, I should convey to you the following information.

Since the start of the so-called operation to liberate Manbij, the so-called international coalition has carried out daily air strikes against that city. The majority of those air strikes have caused death and injury to civilians, but no casualties among the terrorists of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. A large number of civilian homes were destroyed by those air strikes, along with the Hilwaniyah, Ghandurah, Dadat and Arab Hasan bridges, which link the areas of Jarabulus and Manbij; the consumer products company warehouse; Ghassaniyah School; the grain silos; and the sugar factory at Maskanah.

The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its position regarding counter-terrorism, which it has set out in identical letters addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, including the letter issued under the symbol A/68/984-S/2014/642.

The Syrian Arab Republic once again calls for an immediate cessation of such violations and reiterates that it has the right to demand compensation from the States of the so-called international coalition for their deliberate destruction of Syrian infrastructure and service, industrial, production and gas installations.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-11689 (E) 080716 120716

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United Nations S/2016/589

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2016

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. On 14 July 2015, diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union with the Islamic Republic of Iran culminated in agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On 20 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council endorsed the Plan and called upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to support its implementation. On 18 October 2015, the date of adoption of the agreement (Adoption Day), the Plan came into effect and its participants began to take steps to implement their commitments.

2. On 16 January 2016, upon the submission by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the IAEA Board of Governors, and, in parallel, to the Security Council, of a report confirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (S/2016/57, annex), I welcomed the achievement of reaching the day of implementation of the Plan (Implementation Day), a key milestone that reflected the good-faith efforts of all parties to the agreement.

3. On the same day, in line with paragraph 7 of resolution 2231 (2015), with the submission of this IAEA report, all provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) were terminated[1] and all the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) entered into force. All States are now to comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5 and the provisions in paragraphs 6 (a) to (f) of annex B to the resolution for the duration specified therein and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of annex B to the

[1] These included the proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programmes-related embargo, the arms embargo, the travel ban and asset freeze, the various financial measures and business restrictions and the ban on the provision of bunkering services. The provisions relating to the mandates of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and its Panel of Experts were also terminated on Implementation Day.

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resolution.[2] The Security Council requested me to report on the implementation of those provisions every six months.

4. The present report is submitted in fulfilment of that request and the request of the President of the Security Council that I submit a report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), with findings and recommendations (S/2016/44, para. 7).

II. Key findings and recommendations

5. Six months since Implementation Day, I am encouraged by the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and the transparency measures contained in the Plan. The Agency reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared material or activities were ongoing. Since Implementation Day, the Agency has been verifying and monitoring the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. I call upon Member States to continue to provide support to IAEA so that it may fulfil its mandate under the Plan. In addition, there have been no reports of the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015).

6. The key practical arrangements for supporting the work of the Security Council and its facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) are in place. In particular, the necessary operational linkages between the Council and the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for the processing of nuclear-related proposals submitted by Member States under the procurement channel have been established, with due regard given to information security and confidentiality. Optional forms in all six official languages of the United Nations are also available for use by Member States.

7. These positive developments notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran brought to the attention of the Secretariat its view that it has yet to fully benefit from the lifting of multilateral and national sanctions. The concerns raised by the country include issues such as the United States Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 and the confiscation of Central Bank assets following a United States court order. Annex I to the present report reflects the information obtained by the Secretariat in the course of its contacts with Iranian

[2] These include provisions on nuclear-related transfers, which will apply for up to 10 years, provisions on missile-related transfers and financial measures, including an asset freeze, which will apply for up to 8 years, and provisions on arms-related transfers and a travel ban, which will apply for up to 5 years. In October 2025, provided that the provisions of previous Security Council resolutions have not been reinstated in the event of significant non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, all the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) will be terminated and the Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue.

representatives.[3] Implementation challenges exist for any agreement, in particular one as comprehensive and complex as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I call upon all participants to remain steadfast in their commitment to the full implementation of the agreement and work through challenges in a spirit of cooperation and compromise, good faith and reciprocity. In that regard, I am encouraged by the strong commitments of the European Union and the United States to ensuring that the Plan works for all its participants, including by delivering benefits to the Iranian people.[4]

8. With regard to the implementation of the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), I am concerned by the ballistic missile launches conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran in March 2016. I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to refrain from conducting such launches, given that they have the potential to increase tensions in the region. Whereas it is for the Security Council to interpret its own resolutions, I am concerned that those launches are not consistent with the constructive spirit demonstrated by the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

9. I am also concerned by the reported seizure of an arms shipment by the United States Navy in the Gulf of Oman in March 2016 (see annex II). The United States concluded that the arms had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and were likely bound for Yemen. The Islamic Republic of Iran has informed the Secretariat that it never engaged in such delivery (see annex I). I would like to remind all Member States of their obligation to fully implement paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), and I call upon them to provide reports on any arms seizures to the Council and to my Office.

10. I wish to draw the attention of the Security Council to the participation of Iranian entities in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition, held in Baghdad in March. No prior approval was requested from the Council for the transfer of arms from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Iraq. The Secretariat has sought clarification from both countries on the issue. The Islamic Republic of Iran has indicated to the Secretariat that, in its view, such an activity did not require prior approval of the Council, given that it retained ownership of the items displayed (see annex I). I recommend that the Council clarify whether paragraph 6 (b) applies to all supply, sale or transfer regardless of change of ownership.

11. An entity on the list established under resolution 2231 (2015)[5] and maintained by the Security Council, the Defence Industries Organisation, also appears to have participated in the exhibition and should have been subject to action under the asset-freeze provisions of the resolution. Likewise, I am informing the Security Council

[3] See also paragraph 6 of the annex to the letter dated 20 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, entitled "Statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" (S/2015/550).

[4] See the "Statement by France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on post-JCPOA business with Iran", issued on 19 May 2016. Available from http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2016/160519_05_en.htm.

[5] See www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. Individuals on the list established under resolution 2231 (2015) are subject to the asset freeze and travel ban restrictions. Listed entities are subject to the asset freeze. There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities listed.

that open-source information indicates that a listed individual, Major General Qasem Soleimani, recently travelled to Iraq. The Secretariat has also sought clarification from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq on those issues, and I intend to report back to the Council accordingly.

12. In its response to queries on the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition and the travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani, Iraq informed the Secretariat that it was "fully aware of its obligations according to its understanding regarding resolution 2231 (2015) specifically, operative paragraph 7 (a) and paragraph 18 in annex A, which clearly terminated all previous resolutions and sanctions regime set out in resolutions adopted from 2006-2015". Furthermore, Iraq stated that resolution 2231 (2015) was "lengthy, technical and confusing". This demonstrates the importance of further awareness-raising and outreach activities on the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) and the obligations of Member States.

III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

13. In March and June 2016, IAEA issued quarterly reports on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/250 and S/2016/535). The Agency reported that it was continuing to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran were ongoing. The Agency also reported verifying and monitoring the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In addition, since 16 January 2016, I have not received any report, nor am I aware of any open-source information, regarding the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015).

14. In resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of a dedicated procurement channel for the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan. Through this channel, the Council will review and decide on recommendations from the Joint Commission established under the Plan regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

15. Provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, all States may now participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer of dual-use and nuclear items, materials, equipment, goods and technology,[6]

[6] The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2, as well as any other items that the State determines could contribute to reprocessing or enrichment-related or heavy water-related activities inconsistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

and the provision of various related services or assistance.[7] States may also permit the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial nuclear-related activities in another State provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Council.[8] When submitting a proposal to the Council, States are encouraged to use the optional application form and model end-use certification developed by the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission available on the Council webpage dedicated to resolution 2231 (2015)[9] and to submit those forms in a machine-readable format. States are also encouraged to send proposals to the Council facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) through their permanent missions to the United Nations.

16. As at the date of submission of the present report, one proposal had been submitted to the Security Council. The proposal, for a temporary export of dual-use items to the Islamic Republic of Iran for the purpose of an exhibit, was subsequently withdrawn.

17. Certain nuclear-related activities do not require prior approval but do require a notification to the Security Council and the Joint Commission. Those activities are, inter alia, those directly related to the necessary modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production, the export from the Islamic Republic of Iran of enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg in return for natural uranium and the modernization of the Arak reactor. Six exemption notifications were received between July 2015 and January 2016, all in relation to the export of enriched uranium in return for natural uranium. No notifications have been received by the Council since Implementation Day.

18. The restrictions established under paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) will apply until October 2025 or until the date on which IAEA submits its report indicating the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains in peaceful activities (the "broader conclusion" report),[10] whichever is earlier. Should IAEA submit such a report before October 2025, the requirement to obtain prior approval from the Security Council for nuclear-related activities set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) will be replaced by the requirement to notify the Council and the Joint Commission at least 10 working days in advance of such activities.

[7] The provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in paragraph 2 (a) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

[8] Activity in another State involving uranium mining or production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1, and such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by the Islamic Republic of Iran, its nationals and entities incorporated in the Islamic Republic of Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them.

[9] See www.un.org/en/sc/2231/restrictions-nuclear.shtml.

[10] In paragraph 6 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council requested that as soon as IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of IAEA will submit a report confirming that conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council.

IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions

A. Restrictions on Iranian ballistic missile-related activities

19. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. That restriction will apply until October 2023 or until the date on which IAEA submits its "broader conclusion" report, whichever is earlier.

20. Early in March, during military exercises, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a series of ballistic missiles (see fig. I). According to official Iranian news agencies and a report provided to me by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, the missiles launched included the Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile and the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile. Images and video footage released by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps suggest that at least one of the missiles bore an inscription calling for the destruction of Israel. Both missiles are based on Scud liquid-propellant technology and are both capable of delivering a payload of approximately 700 kg, to a range of 700 km for the Qiam-1 and to a range of 1,300 to 2,000 km for the Shahab-3.

Figure I
Various Iranian ballistic missile launches from undisclosed locations released by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on 9 March 2016

Source: Sepah News (official Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps online news site).

21. In identical letters dated 23 March (S/2016/279), the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that those launches were not inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015), given that it had not undertaken "any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons". The country underlined that it had never sought to acquire nuclear weapons and never would, as it fully honoured its commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It noted that the resolution did not prohibit legitimate and conventional military activities and that the language of paragraph 3 of annex B to the resolution was clearly not mandatory.

22. On 28 March, I received a letter from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States in which it was stressed that those launches were destabilizing, provocative and that they had been conducted in defiance of resolution 2231 (2015). Those States underscored that the phrase "ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons" in resolution 2231 (2015) included all Missile Technology Control Regime Category I systems, defined as those capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km, which are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Given that the Qiam-1 and Shahab-3 are Category I missiles, those States concluded that the launches of those missiles constituted an "activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons" and "launches using such ballistic missile technology", which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been called upon not to undertake pursuant to paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

23. I am aware that the Security Council discussed those launches on 14 March and 1 April. I also recognize that there was no consensus reached among Council members as to whether those launches were covered under resolution 2231 (2015). Whereas it is for the Council to interpret its own resolutions, we must maintain the momentum created by the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, consistent with its constructive spirit. In that regard, I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to avoid such ballistic missile launches that have the potential to increase tensions in the region.

B. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran

24. Since 16 January, pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, all States may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology[11] and the provision of various services or assistance.[12] Prior approval from the Council is also required for the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial ballistic missile-related activities.[13]

25. This provision will apply until October 2023 or until the date on which IAEA submits its "broader conclusion" report, whichever is earlier. As at the date of

[11] The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime list (S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

[12] The provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in paragraph 4 (a) or related to the activities described in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

[13] The acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in any commercial activity in another State related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in paragraph 4 (a) or related to the activities described in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

submission of the present report, no proposal had been submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In addition, since 16 January, no information regarding the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of ballistic missile-related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) has been brought to the attention of either the Security Council or myself.

V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

26. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, all States may now participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of various services or assistance relating to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of those arms and related materiel.[14]

27. The Security Council also decided, in paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), that all States were to take the measures necessary to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the Council in advance, on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

28. Both provisions will apply until October 2020, or until the date on which IAEA submits its "broader conclusion" report, whichever is earlier. As at the date of submission of the present report, no proposals had been submitted by Member States to the Security Council pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

29. On 7 June, I received a report from the United States providing information on an arms seizure that, in its assessment, had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. That information was also communicated to the Security Council and to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014). Furthermore, open-source information indicated that Iranian entities had participated in and had displayed arms during a foreign defence exhibition. I am also aware of certain media reports that suggest that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been providing arms to Hizbullah.[15] During the reporting period I have received no reports from Member States on such transfers, nor do I have independent information to corroborate the media reports.

[14] The provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel described in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

[15] See, for example, "Israel's main concern in Syria: Iran, not ISIS", Wall Street Journal, 17 March 2016; and "Lebanese army slowly crushing extremists near Syria border", Associated Press, 22 June 2016.

Arms seizure: *Adris*

30. In its report, the United States indicated that it had seized an arms shipment from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was likely bound for Yemen (see annex II). According to the report, on 28 March, a United States Navy ship boarded a dhow, the *Adris*, which was transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman. That action, which the United States took in accordance with customary international law, as stated in its report, resulted in the discovery of a large weapons cache aboard the vessel, which included 1,500 Kalashnikov variant rifles, 200 RPG-7 and RPG-7V rocket-propelled grenade launchers and 21 DshK 12.7-mm machine guns (see fig. II). On the basis of an analysis of available information, including interviews with the crew and a review of the arms, the United States concluded that the arms had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and that their transfer was being undertaken contrary to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). After the weapons were seized, the dhow and its crew were allowed to depart.

31. The representatives of the Secretariat met with members of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in New York on 8 June, to inform them of this report and, subsequently, wrote to the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations to seek clarification on the shipment. The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejected this allegation (see annex I). The Secretariat is still reviewing the information provided by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and I intend to provide an update on this arms seizure to the Security Council in due course.

Figure II
Kalashnikov variant rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and machine guns seized on-board the *Adris* on 28 March 2016



Source: United States.

Arms transfer: Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition

32. According to open-source information, several Iranian entities participated in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition, held from 5 to 8 March at the Baghdad International Fairground. According to images published by the Islamic Republic News Agency[16] and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news agency, items

[16] "Baghdad exhibit featuring the Islamic Republic of Iran defence, military capabilities", Islamic Republic News Agency, 5 March 2016.

displayed by those entities appeared to include small arms, artillery ammunition and rockets (see fig. III). It is my understanding that such an arms transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Iraq should have required prior approval from the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat has raised its concerns with the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations, in New York, and has invited both Member States to provide further information. Iranian representatives considered that no prior approval was required from the Council for this activity because the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited (see annex I).

Figure III
Items displayed by Iranian entities during the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition



Source: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news agency (left) and Islamic Republic News Agency (right).

VI. Asset freeze

33. The Security Council decided, in paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), that all States were to freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the individuals and entities on the list established under resolution 2231 (2015) and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources were made available to those individuals and entities. That provision will apply until October 2023 or until the date on which IAEA submits its "broader conclusion" report, whichever is earlier.

34. The list established under resolution 2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) who were delisted on Implementation Day. As specified in that paragraph, the Council can delist individuals or entities, and list additional individuals and entities, found to meet certain designation criteria defined in the

resolution.[17] On 17 January, the Council decided to delist one entity, Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International.[18]

35. During the reporting period, it appears that an entity currently on the list established under resolution 2231 (2015), the Defence Industries Organisation, may have participated in the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition, which was held in March (see para. 32 and fig. IV). I wish to stress that, pursuant to paragraph 6 (c) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Iraqi authorities should have frozen all of the entity's funds, other financial assets and economic resources on Iraqi territory at the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or at any time thereafter. This concern was also raised with members of the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations by the Secretariat, and both Member States were invited to provide further information. I intend to report back to the Security Council in due course.

Figure IV
Iranian booth at the Fifth Iraq Defence Exhibition and logo of the Defence Industries Organisation

Source: Still frame of video released by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting news agency (left) and the website of the Defence Industries Organisation (www.diomil.ir/en/home.aspx) accessed through the Wayback Machine Internet archive (http://archive.org/web/web.php) (right).

[17] Pursuant to paragraph 6 (c) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Council may designate additional individuals and entities for having engaged in, directly associated with or provided support for the proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran undertaken contrary to its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified in the resolution; having assisted designated individuals or entities in evading or acting inconsistently with the Plan or the resolution; having acted on behalf or at the direction of designated individuals or entities; or having been owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities, including through illicit means.

[18] Security Council, press release of 17 January 2016, entitled "Security Council removes Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International from 2231 list".

VII. Travel ban

36. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the individuals on the list established under resolution 2231 (2015) (see para. 34 above).[19] That provision will apply until October 2020 or until the date on which IAEA submits its "broader conclusion" report, whichever is earlier.

37. During the reporting period, it was brought to my attention that at least one listed individual might have engaged in foreign travel. On 25 May, an Iranian news agency reproduced photographs showing the Commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General Qasem Soleimani, in what was referred to as the "Fallujah operations room" in Iraq (see fig. V).[20] On 27 May, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that "Iranian military advisers are in Iraq under Major General Qasem Soleimani on the request of the legal government of Iraq".[21] On 29 May, the Deputy Head of the Iraqi volunteer forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who appeared in the same photograph, reportedly stated that General Soleimani's presence in Iraq was at the request of the Government of Iraq.[22] On 6 June, during a press conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, while not denying that Major General Soleimani had visited Iraq, emphasized that he had done so as a military adviser.[23] The Secretariat has also raised the matter with members of the Permanent Missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq to the United Nations, in New York, and has invited both Member States to provide clarification on the issue. Similarly, I intend to report back to the Security Council in due course.

[19] This provision does not oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory. Furthermore, the travel ban restriction does not apply when the Security Council determines, on a case-by-case basis, that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Council concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of resolution 2231 (2015).

[20] Fars News Agency, "Iran's Gen. Soleimani in Fallujah operations room", 25 May 2016. Available from http://en.farsnews.com/imgrep.aspx?nn=13950304001274.

[21] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, "Spokesman slams Saudi FM for anti-Iran statements", 27 May 2016. Available from www7.irna.ir/en/News/82090143.

[22] For example, see Tasnim News Agency, "General Soleimani in Iraq at Baghdad's request: Voluntary Force official", 29 May 2016. Available from www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/05/29/1087056/general-soleimani-in-iraq-at-baghdad-s-request-voluntary-force-official.

[23] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Press conference of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq and the Head of the Sunni Endowment Dewan, held in Amman on 6 June 2016. Available from www.mofa.gov.iq/ab/news.php?articleid=856 (in Arabic).

Figure V
General Soleimani in the "Fallujah operations room"

Source: Fars News Agency, published on 25 May 2016 with the following caption: "Iraqi Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba media group published photos of popular forces operations room showing Iran's Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani discussing Fallujah battle strategies with Badr commander Hadi Al-'Amiri, Nujaba's Akram Al-Ka'abi and another popular fighters' commander, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis" (General Soleimani is featured on the extreme left).

VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

38. Since the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs has devoted considerable effort to putting into place the practical arrangements to support the work of the Council and its facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also liaised with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for the establishment of the procurement channel.

39. Since 16 January, the Division has provided support to the organization and staffing of two informal meetings of the Security Council at the expert level and to an open briefing to inform Member States about the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division also processed all incoming and outgoing communications relating to implementation of the resolution. To actively promote available information on the restrictions imposed by the Council, including the procurement channel, on the day of the implementation, the Division launched a webpage dedicated to resolution 2231 (2015) on the Council website.[24] In February 2016, documents provided by the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission offering practical information to States on the procurement channel were added to the website. Revised versions of those documents were provided by the Working Group in May. In April, the presentations delivered by the Security Council

[24] See www.un.org/en/sc/2231.

facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and representatives of the Working Group during an open briefing were also added.

40. In close cooperation with the Security Council facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, the Division established the required processes to facilitate the timely translation of proposals and secured electronic transmission and tracking of all proposals submitted by States and all subsequent related communications between Member States, the Security Council and the Joint Commission. The working language of the Joint Commission is English, but Member States may submit proposals to the Security Council in any of the six official languages of the United Nations.

41. The Division has responded to several queries from Member States about the procurement channel, including the procedures for submission of proposals and the review process, exemptions to the channel and confidentiality issues.

Annex I

Information obtained by the Secretariat in the course of its contacts with Iranian representatives*

A. Allegations

1. Iran's views on resolution 2231 have been elaborated extensively in its Statement issued following its adoption (document S/2015/550), which remains valid in full. Accordingly, Iran continues to insist that all sanctions and restrictive measures introduced against Iran including those applied under the pretext of its nuclear programme, have been baseless, unjust and unlawful, hence nothing in the JCPOA shall be construed to imply, directly or indirectly, an admission of or acquiescence by Iran in the legitimacy, validity or enforceability of the sanctions and restrictive measures adopted against Iran by the Security Council, the European Union or its member States, the United States or any other State, nor shall it be construed as a waiver or a limitation on the exercise of any related right the Islamic Republic of Iran is entitled to under relevant national legislation, international instruments or legal principles.

2. At the same time, taking into account the fact that, by acting under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Council decided to terminate the provisions of all resolutions issued in regard to the Iran's nuclear program, all sanctions and restrictive measures imposed by such resolutions have been removed completely. Measures contained in Annex B of resolution 2231 do not amount to prohibitions or sanctions and solely entail procedures for certain issues for a limited time-frame.

3. In view of the above, attention is drawn to the following:

3.1 In regard to allegation of arms delivery to Yemen, Iran categorically rejects the allegation as it has never engaged in such delivery.

3.2 In relations to the Iraq Defense Exhibition, no supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel which may entail prior approval of the Council has taken place, the items are only exhibited and no change of title or ownership takes place.

B. EU/US' defective implementation of resolution 2231

Despite U.S. and EU's clear commitments with regard to lifting of sanctions, Iran has not been able to fully benefit from lifting of Sanctions due to a series of deficiencies and/or non-performance on the part of either U.S. or the EU. The following are some examples of the actions taken by them in spite of the resolution and its Annexes:

1. The US Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015: Under this Act, nationals of Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries who have travelled to or been present in Iran from 1 March 2011 or those who are also nationals of Iran are no longer eligible to travel or be admitted to the United States under the VWP. It was announced later that a case by case waiver might be issued for individuals who travelled to Iran for legitimate business-related

* The information contained herein is reproduced as received.

purposes following the conclusion of the JCPOA (July 14, 2015). There are no waivers for tourist trips to Iran. The new Act was adopted against several provisions of the JCPOA, including paragraphs 26, 28 and 29. In accordance with paragraph 26 of the JCPOA, the United States is committed to prevent interference with the realization of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. Under Paragraph 28 of the JCPOA, the US is committed to refrain from any action that would undermine its successful implementation. General Provisions of the JCPOA, Paragraph viii, The same has been stipulated in the, which goes as far as stating that the E3/EU+ 3 will refrain from 'imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. Also, paragraph 29 of the JCPOA has committed the United States to refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran.

2. Confiscation of the Central Bank assets following a U.S. court order: Less than 4 months after the JCPOA's Implementation Day, around US$ 1.8 billion of Iran Central Bank's assets were seized following a U.S. court order. The Central Bank does not also have access to another approximately 1.7 billion US$ of its assets held in Clear stream, Luxemburg, under similar grounds. This unlawful and illegitimate act is inconsistent with the spirit of the JCPOA.

3. Continuing U.S.' State and local sanctions: In addition to many sanction legislations existed prior to JCPOA, some States and local governments have enacted new divestment legislations and persist in their enforcement of sanctions, even by sending threatening correspondence to foreign banks and companies querying them about their investment in Iranian energy sectors in the post JCPOA era. In accordance with Para 25 of the JCPOA the US shall "actively encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change". Formalistic writing of letters cannot be considered active encouragement.

4. The US Presidential Executive Order 13645 is re-introduced inconsistent with the JCPOA: Executive Order 13645 was supposed to be terminated as of "Implementation Day" consistent with Paragraph 21(xix) of the JCPOA, Paragraph 4 of its Annex II, and Paragraph 17.4 of its Annex V. Although Section l(d) of Executive Order No. 13716 revoked that Executive Order, several parts of the revoked Order including its section 9 to 19 are reintroduced in the Executive Order No.13716. This is not consistent with United States commitment for termination of the Executive Order as well as paragraph 26 of the JCPOA regarding refraining from re-introduction or re-imposition of lifted sanctions.

5. The Inability of the Iranian Central Bank to have free access to its assets held abroad due to the US lack of cooperation in converting those assets into non-US currencies as well as for their transfer, despite the U.S. commitments in this regard under paragraph 21(iv) and paragraphs and 7.2 of Annex IV of JCPOA.

6. Continuing reluctance on the part of non-American banks to do business with Iran due to OFAC's dissuading behavior, including through settlement agreements that officially bar those banks from re-engaging with Iran.

7. Introducing discriminatory restriction for the sale of dual use items (other than those items in NSG list) to Iran by the EU: A list of items that before the

JCPOA were exported to Iran without an End User Certificate signed by an Iranian Authority, have been added to Annex II of EU Regulation 1861 which necessitates such procedures. This makes the export of these items more difficult than even before the JCPOA.

8. Introduction of authorization regimes for metal and software by the EU: Annexes VIIA and VIIB of Council regulation 1861/2015 lists metal and software that are subject to a new authorization regime which is new restriction, especially when it utilizes negative textual structures such as "the competent authorities shall not grant any authorization..." and broad and obscure restrictive terms and conditions like "... indirect benefit of IRGC" which is very restrictive.

9. Moreover, Iranian civilian aircraft passengers are not still given fuel in some EU destinations. And still we have to wait for cumbersome US sanctions-induced problems in order to execute our agreements and contracts with Airbus and others to buy passenger aircrafts.

Please note that the above problems, deficiencies and defective performances are happening despite the fact that Iran has honored its obligations in full.

Annex II

Report dated 7 June 2016 from the United States of America regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015)*

The United States would like to share information with the Security Council and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) ("Yemen Sanctions Committee") regarding a shipment of arms and related material from Iran, which were likely bound for Yemen. This information may be useful to the Facilitator for implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) ("Facilitator"), the Yemen Sanctions Committee, the Yemen Panel of Experts, and the Secretary General in carrying out their mandates with respect to reported violations of UN Security Council resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015).

On March 28, 2016, at 1930Z, the U.S. Navy Coastal Patrol ship USS Sirocco, operating as part of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, encountered and boarded a dhow transiting international waters in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman. This action was taken in accordance with customary international law. Following discovery of a large weapons cache found aboard the vessel, the USS Gravely was directed to the scene by U.S. authorities to relieve the USS Sirocco. The USS Gravely took control of the arms cargo.

Paragraph 6(b) of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) requires Iran not to supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals any arms or related material until the date five years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier, absent approval in advance on a case-by-case basis by the Security Council. Based on an analysis of available information, including crew interviews and review of the arms aboard the vessel, the United States concluded that the arms originated in Iran and that their transfer from Iran violated paragraph 6(b) of Annex B of resolution 2231. Interviews with the crew revealed strong indications that the arms were being smuggled from Iran. The United States intends to share additional information obtained as a result of the boarding with the Security Council Affairs Division for use in relation to the report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231.

The transfer of these arms to forces acting on the behalf of or at the direction of individuals on the UN Yemen sanctions list would be a violation of paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015).

The cargo seized on board the dhow included 1,500x Kalashnikov variant rifles, 200x RPG-7 and RPG-7V Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers (RPGs), and 21x DshK 12.7mm machine guns. The dhow and its crew were allowed to depart once the weapons were seized.

The United States is concerned that Iran's exports of weapons continue in violation of Iran's obligations under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). Transfers to Yemen in violation of the arms embargo imposed in resolution 2216 (2015) also undermine opportunities to achieve peace in the region and reduce the suffering of the people of Yemen.

* The information contained herein is reproduced as received.

We trust this information will assist the Security Council in promoting implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). In light of the requests made of the Secretary-General in resolution 2231 and S/2016/44, we therefore respectfully request that the Secretary-General report fully and thoroughly Iran's exports of arms in violation of resolution 2231. The United States also encourages the Security Council and the Yemen Sanctions Committee to raise this incident with Iran directly and to review additional ways to improve enforcement of these measures. The United States offers its assistance with any investigation undertaken.

United Nations S/2016/590

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Eleventh report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013)

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013), covers developments pertaining to the issues of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives, since the issuance of my previous report, dated 22 April 2016 (S/2016/372).

2. Bilateral ties between Iraq and Kuwait continued to strengthen during the reporting period. On 26 April, my Special Representative for Iraq met in Baghdad with the Chargé d'affaires of the Embassy of Kuwait in Iraq, Khalid al-Janai. My Special Representative briefed him on his official visit to Kuwait, held on 6 April, and on the activities planned by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to reinvigorate the file of missing Kuwaiti persons and property, including by reaching out to witnesses and other stakeholders. Mr. Al-Janai welcomed the UNAMI efforts and expressed the support of Kuwait for the Government and people of Iraq, in addition to his country's readiness to continue to provide assistance on the humanitarian front.

3. On 14 June, in an effort to enhance bilateral relations between Iraq and Kuwait, the Iraqi Council of Ministers adopted a decision to lift an order to seize real estate property owned by Kuwaiti citizens in Iraq, which had been imposed in 1995 by the now-dissolved Office of the Presidency of the Republic. The Council stipulated that the ban would be lifted provided that no legal obstacles existed and would be granted in return for the lifting of the freeze on real estate property owned by Iraqi citizens in Kuwait.

II. Recent activities with regard to the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, or their remains

4. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) researcher, who is engaged in supporting the in-depth scientific review agreed upon during the Tripartite Commission meeting of October 2015, undertook a two-week visit to Baghdad from 9 to 21 April to review the archives of the Ministry of Defence. The information gathered is being entered into a database for review by the forensic external expert who joined the team on 16 May and has since begun an initial

Please recycle

assessment of the file. On 11 April, my Special Representative met the President of ICRC, Peter Maurer, in Geneva. They discussed the activities of UNAMI and the ICRC activities on the file. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment and pledged to continue to cooperate on the matter.

5. On 27 April, the Ministry of Defence of Iraq submitted its plan of action for 2016 to ICRC, outlining its planned excavation work, contacts with witnesses and other activities relating to the search for the missing and the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals. The document has also been shared with the Kuwaiti National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs. The plan of action details priorities for the remainder of the year, including field work on the Khamisiyah and Radwaniyah sites, a review of the information pertaining to the Karbala' site, an expansion of the media campaign and follow-up activities with existing witnesses.

6. During the reporting period, the Ministry of Defence of Iraq contacted witnesses in order to obtain more detailed information in support of the identification of potential burial sites. On 10 May, at an Iraqi interministerial meeting, which was held under the chairmanship of the Ministry, issues pertaining to the witnesses were discussed, and agreement on a way forward was reached.

7. On 11 May, a field trip was conducted to the Radwaniyah site by the Ministry of Defence of Iraq in follow-up to previous work, with the technical support of ICRC forensic experts. A basic archaeological survey was completed, GPS coordinates were established and excavation sites for future work were identified. On 13 May, a field visit to the Khamisiyah site was undertaken by the Ministry, also with support from the ICRC forensic team, to ascertain the facts on the ground and review the work undertaken to date. The ICRC mission reports from the two field visits are being finalized and will be submitted to the tripartite mechanism members during the next reporting period.

8. Upon the instructions of the Minister of Defence of Iraq, Khalid al-Ubaydi, the Ministry's spokesperson requested all citizens holding information on potential sites, archives and/or Kuwaitis' personal belongings to come forward. His call was broadcast on 18 May on 20 Iraqi channels, including satellite television channels. The video also informed the public that the file on missing Kuwaiti persons had been transferred to the Ministry and provided contact information to reach the Ministry's directorates of human rights and media and moral guidance. Following the broadcast, a new witness came forward with information on a potential burial site. The Ministry is currently analysing the information.

9. On 18 May, as part of his responsibilities under Security Council resolution 2107 (2013), my Deputy Special Representative for Iraq for Political Affairs, Gyorgy Busztin, met the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs and Multilateral Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Omar Barzanji, and underscored the need to undertake specific activities to search for the missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals. While noting that current priorities, notably the continuing efforts to combat Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the dire humanitarian situation, were hampering the Government's ability to finance extensive activities in support of the Kuwaiti file, Mr. Barzanji reiterated his Government's commitment to pushing the work forward. He outlined his current engagement with the Ministry of Defence of Iraq, notably to reach out to new witnesses.

10. On 18 May and 20 June, during meetings with the head of the ICRC delegation in Baghdad, Katharina Ritz, my Deputy Special Representative expressed his expectation that the Ministry of Defence of Iraq would continue to take action on the file. Ms. Ritz said that ICRC had introduced additional forensic expertise to assist the Government of Iraq to increase its chances of obtaining a positive outcome. The parties agreed that the continuation of the work needed to be ensured and that collaboration through the tripartite mechanism would preserve momentum and aid the process.

11. On 19 May, my Deputy Special Representative met the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence of Iraq, Vice Admiral Muhammad Jawad al-Abady, a newly appointed leader of the Ministry's technical team in charge of the missing Kuwaiti persons file. My Deputy Special Representative underlined the international obligation of Iraq to work on the file and the consequent need to show results through actual work on the ground. He encouraged the technical team to work more actively through the tripartite mechanism, which served as an instrument of cooperation and represented the best-placed platform to guide Iraqi efforts. Mr. Al-Abady assured my Deputy Special Representative that the Minister of Defence was keen to resolve all outstanding issues with Kuwait and that the file was being given due importance at and support from the highest government levels. He emphasized that the technical team was fully engaged, committed himself to undertaking the activities needed to advance the work on the file and welcomed the continued assistance and cooperation of UNAMI.

12. On 23 May, UNAMI participated in an observer capacity in the ninety-fourth session of the Technical Subcommittee of the tripartite mechanism, which was held in Kuwait. The lack of tangible results notwithstanding, the renewed commitment and results-oriented approach shown by the Ministry of Defence of Iraq were praised by the Subcommittee members. Kuwait expressed appreciation for the work of and the momentum established by the Ministry, voicing its readiness to assist the new team and expressing the hope that there would be fruitful results. The Iraqi delegation pledged to continue work on the file, the financial challenges notwithstanding, and welcomed Kuwaiti proposals on the 2016 action plan. The proposals advocated including the Salman Pak site, securing the presence of witnesses during field visits to possible burial sites, continuing efforts to reach witnesses and revisiting the ground-penetrating radar initiative for the Khamisiyah excavation works. The updated 2016 action plan was subsequently adopted by the members. ICRC reported that the in-depth scientific review project was continuing, reiterating its gratitude to both Iraq and Kuwait for opening their archives and trusting that that access would be extended in the future in order to complete the review.

13. On 24 May in Kuwait, my Deputy Special Representative held a meeting with the Chair of the National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs, Ibrahim al-Shaheen, who welcomed the technical role of the Ministry of Defence of Iraq on the file and its advantages, especially in terms of its standing, experience and results-oriented approach. He expressed the hope that efforts would be further expanded and that a number of Kuwaiti recommendations would be acted upon in the coming period, namely curbing the length of the transition phase, building on the previous work and history of the file, giving due attention to the Khamisiyah site and following up with witnesses in line with the guidelines agreed upon by the tripartite mechanism members. He recognized the current security

challenges facing the Ministry and its tremendous responsibilities in efforts to combat ISIL, conveying his appreciation that priority had also been given to the Kuwaiti missing persons file. My Deputy Special Representative commended the Committee on its patience and support during the transition period and assured Mr. Al-Shaheen that UNAMI would continue to follow up with the Iraqi side to facilitate the work on the file.

14. A UNAMI delegation, headed by my Deputy Special Representative, attended, in an observer capacity, the forty-second session of the Tripartite Commission, which was held on 25 May in Kuwait. A constructive atmosphere prevailed. The Commission members welcomed the new positive dynamics generated by the Ministry of Defence of Iraq. The members acknowledged that the solution did not lie in any single method or technology and agreed to continue to pursue various approaches in parallel, including field work, outreach to witnesses, the ICRC scientific review project and the utilization of new technology and scientific methodologies, where appropriate. The observer status of UNAMI was extended during the session, with the Kuwaiti delegation welcoming the Mission's continued presence and expressing appreciation for its efforts and use of all resources in supporting the work of the Government of Iraq. Similar sentiments were echoed by ICRC, which praised the positive role of UNAMI and its cooperation with the ICRC delegation in Baghdad.

III. Recent activities with regard to the return of Kuwaiti property

15. On 18 May, during his meeting with Mr. Barzanji, my Deputy Special Representative urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to reinvigorate the search for the missing Kuwaiti property and suggested approaching second-hand booksellers in Baghdad that might be in possession of knowledge of the national archives. Mr. Barzanji took note of the proposal. He informed my Deputy Special Representative that the Iraqi interministerial committee on the Kuwaiti property would be reconvened in the coming period to review the work on the file.

16. During the reporting period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq reached out to other ministries and government institutions to coordinate the search for the missing Kuwaiti property. As a result, thousands of Kuwaiti books were located in the libraries of the Ministry of Higher Education. During a meeting with my Deputy Special Representative on 20 June, Mr. Barzanji informed him that, together with the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was cataloguing, itemizing and packaging the inventory received, in preparation for its official handover to the Government of Kuwait.

IV. Observations

17. I commend the goodwill that continues to prevail between Iraq and Kuwait. I am confident that the strong support, solidarity and encouragement demonstrated by Kuwait is providing the impetus required to reach the full normalization of relations. I call on the Government of Iraq and its citizens to seize this positive momentum and make the efforts needed to attain progress on the file of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the

national archives. I urge Iraqi nationals both within and outside Iraq who possess information on missing Kuwaiti persons and property to come forward.

18. I remain disappointed that no cases of missing Kuwaiti persons have been solved and no human remains exhumed over the past 11 years. Ascertaining the fate of missing persons and providing answers to their grieving families depend on steadfast commitment, action and the adoption of new and innovative ways to push the file forward. Despite an extremely difficult security environment and political and financial challenges, the Government of Iraq has renewed its commitment to the file. I commend the Ministry of Defence for its willingness to fully engage on this important issue, use the resources at its disposal and undertake concrete action in an effort to reach results. I am grateful to the Government of Kuwait for its patience, support and willingness to assist during the transition period.

19. I also applaud the outstanding commitment of the tripartite mechanism members, under the able leadership of ICRC, which has provided a decades-long, fruitful and constructive platform to guide the efforts to locate and recover missing persons and has never lost hope or determination. I fully support the implementation of a parallel approach as a means of achieving tangible results and welcome the adoption of the 2016 Iraqi plan of action with the inclusion of the Kuwaiti recommendations. I encourage the Government of Iraq to continue carrying out field work, reaching out to witnesses and putting to use new scientific methods. I praise both States for allowing access to their respective archives in support of the scientific review project and look forward to its outcome. I am grateful for the confidence and trust placed in UNAMI through the renewal of its observer status. UNAMI is committed to continuing to play an integral and supportive role in the tripartite mechanism.

20. I welcome the revived search for the missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives, which has already borne fruit. I encourage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to continue its efforts and consider UNAMI proposals, in particular searching the government archives and reaching out to second-hand booksellers. I remain hopeful that such efforts and renewed commitment will bring to light information on the national archives.

21. I reiterate the unwavering commitment of UNAMI, as well as of my Special Representative and my Deputy Special Representative, to play their mandated roles in this important humanitarian endeavour.

United Nations S/2016/591

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 July 2016

Original: English

Angola, France, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Underlining its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia,

Condemning recent Al Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, *expressing serious concern* at the ongoing threat posed by Al Shabaab, and *underlining* its concern that Al Shabaab continues to hold territory and extort revenue in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of civilian life, in Al Shabaab attacks, and *paying tribute* to the bravery and sacrifices made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali Security Forces personnel in the fight against Al Shabaab,

Reiterating its determination to support efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab in Somalia, and *underlining* its commitment to support an inclusive Somali-led political peace and reconciliation process,

Expressing grave concern at the continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia,

Welcoming the positive contributions that the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) has made to supporting the gains made by AMISOM and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and *underscoring* the importance of an effective partnership between the United Nations, the African Union (AU) and Member States in Somalia,

Recognizing that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has a responsibility to protect its citizens and build its own national security forces, *noting* that these forces should be inclusive and representative of Somalia and act in full compliance with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and *reaffirming* the intent of international partners to support the FGS in achieving this,

Welcoming the FGS and regional leaders' endorsement of a new National Security Policy, *calling on* the FGS to accelerate its implementation in view of the

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remaining threat posed by Al-Shabaab, *underlining* the importance of further defining the composition of Somalia's national security forces, identifying capability gaps in order to guide AMISOM and donors' security sector assistance priorities and signalling areas of cooperation with the international community, and *noting* the international community's intention to support the FGS in security sector reform,

Recognizing that a more stable Somalia is of vital importance to ensuring regional security,

AMISOM

Commending the contribution of AMISOM to lasting peace and stability in Somalia, *noting* its critical role in improving the security situation, *expressing* its appreciation for the continued commitment of troops, police and equipment to AMISOM by the Governments of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and other African nations, and *recognizing* the significant sacrifices made by AMISOM forces,

Welcoming the support of the international community to peace and stability in Somalia, in particular the European Union for its substantial contribution in supporting AMISOM, as well as support from other bilateral partners to both AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA), and *emphasizing* the importance of new contributions, including from the African Union Peace Fund, the private sector, civil society and other donations, in order to share the financial burden of supporting AMISOM,

Taking note of the African Union Peace and Security Council's communiqué of 28 April 2016 on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM,

Welcoming the holding of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the troop and police contributing countries of AMISOM in Djibouti on 28 February 2016, and their commitment to improving coordination within AMISOM and to the revitalisation of AMISOM operations, *welcomes* the development of the revised Concept of Operations 2016 for AMISOM, as endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council on 29 June 2016 and *looks forward* to its implementation,

Welcoming the AU's investigation of allegations of sexual violence against some AMISOM troops, *underlining* the importance of the AU implementing the recommendations of the report, and in line with resolution 2272 (2016), *calling on* the AU and troop-contributing countries to ensure that allegations are properly and thoroughly investigated and appropriate and timely follow-up action is taken, including full investigation of those cases of abuse referred to the AU investigation team,

Expressing concern over the continued activities of Al Shabaab and reports of pro-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) elements in Somalia and the security implications of the situation in Yemen for Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

AMISOM

1. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that conditions in Somalia are not appropriate for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission;

2. *Continues to agree* with the revised benchmarks as set out in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council of 2 July 2015, *agrees* with his conclusion that the achievement of the benchmarks could pave the way for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation which could help consolidate the peace process in Somalia and the development of Somali security sector institutions, and *requests* the Secretary-General to keep these benchmarks under continuous review, in consultation with the AU;

3. *Underlines* that the increases in the force strength decided in resolution 2036 (2012) and 2124 (2013) are to provide short term enhancement to AMISOM's military capacity, and as part of an overall exit strategy for AMISOM, after which a decrease in AMISOM's force strength will be considered in light of progress on the ground;

Priorities and tasks

4. *Decides* to authorize the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM up to a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 May 2017, and *further decides* that AMISOM shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with participating States' obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate;

5. *Decides to authorize* AMISOM to implement the following strategic objectives:

(a) Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;

(b) Provide security in order to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia;

(c) Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces;

6. *Decides to authorize* AMISOM to carry out the following priority tasks:

(a) To continue to conduct offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;

(b) To maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, in coordination with the Somali security forces;

(c) To assist with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, and ensure the security of the electoral process in Somalia as a key requirement;

(d) To secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and

those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU;

7. *Further decides* to authorize AMISOM to carry out the following essential tasks:

(a) To conduct joint operations with the Somali security forces, within its capabilities, in coordination with other parties, as part of the implementation of the Somali national security plans and to contribute to the wider effort of training and mentoring of the security forces of the FGS;

(b) To contribute, within its capabilities as may be requested, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(c) To engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local populations, within its capabilities, which will allow for longer term stabilisation by the United Nations Country Team and other actors;

(d) To provide and assist, as appropriate, protection to the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure;

(e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council;

(f) To receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report, in consultation with the FGS and AMISOM, on progress in securing key supply routes as described in paragraph 6 (d) in his written reports on the situation in Somalia to the Security Council;

9. *Requests* that, in line with the recommendations of the Joint AU-UN Review, the AU enable a surge in its efficiency and ensure that AMISOM is configured to conduct the full range of required operations effectively, in particular by strengthening command and control structures, enhancing cross-sector operations, examining sector boundaries, and generating a dedicated quick reaction forces' capability under the authority of the Force Commander, which should operate alongside existing Somali forces;

10. *Recalls* its request that the AU generate the specialised units set out in the annex to this resolution and as recommended by the Joint Report of 2 October 2013 and set out in the Secretary-General's letter of 14 October 2013, within in the existing troop ceiling, and authorized in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012), and ensuring that all force enablers and multipliers operate under the command of the Force Commander, and *further requests* that these are generated without delay and reflected in the revised Concept of Operations and requests regular updates on this force generation through the Secretary-General;

11. *Stresses* the critical need to source contingent-owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012) either from existing AMISOM troop-contributing countries or other Member States, *emphasizes* in particular the need for an appropriate aviation

component of up to twelve military helicopters under the command of the Force Commander, and *urges* the immediate generation of this component;

12. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's commitment to work with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, troop-contributing countries, and Federal Government of Somalia to help ensure that a surge in efficien[illegible] materialises and is sustained over time, and reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to monitor implementation of the surge, including through performance indicators, and in this regard to keep the Council updated in the Secretary-General's regular reporting;

13. *Notes with concern* that the delay in the appointment of the Force Commander has impacted the Mission's effectiveness, *commends* the decision of the Government of Djibouti to nominate the Force Commander, and *looks forward* to his immediate deployment;

14. *Underlines* the importance of AMISOM forces carrying out their mandate in full compliance with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and cooperating with UNSOM and UNSOS in implementing the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to Non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP), and *calls upon* the AU to investigate and report allegations of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, as well as continuing to ensure the highest standards of transparency, and conduct and discipline;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that any support provided to non-United Nations security forces is provided in strict compliance with the HRDDP and to include progress made in implementing the policy in the Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council;

16. *Welcomes* the commencement of activities establishing a Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) as requested in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2124 (2013), and *underlines* the importance of making the CCTARC operational and effective without further delay, and in this regard *urges* the full support of troop and police contributors for the CCTARC, in collaboration with humanitarian, human rights and protection actors, and *underlines* the importance of ensuring information is shared with relevant actors including the United Nations;

17. *Requests* AMISOM to use its CCTARC as part of its reporting on joint AMISOM operations with the Somali security forces;

18. *Requests* the AU to keep the Security Council regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of AMISOM's mandate, and report to the Council, through the provision of oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, every 120 days with the first written report no later than 12 September 2016;

Support and partnership

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General to work closely with the AU in supporting the implementation of this resolution, *further requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the AU on the planning, deployment and strategic management of AMISOM through the United

Nations office to the AU, and *reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General, in view of the need to increase AMISOM's efficiency, to enhance the provision of technical advice to the AU through existing United Nations mechanisms;

20. *Agrees* with the Secretary-General that a joint AMISOM-United Nations-Somali planning mechanism should assess and facilitate the delivery of AMISOM's mandate in line with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this resolution, ensuring in particular thorough coordination and consultation ahead of, during and after offensive operations;

21. *Reiterates* its call for new donors to support AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment, technical assistance and uncaveated funding for AMISOM to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, *calls upon* the AU to consider how to provide sustainable funding for AMISOM, and *underlines* the AU's call for its Member States to provide financial support to AMISOM;

22. *Emphasizes* the Report of the Joint United Nations-African Union Review of AMISOM of 2 October 2013 and the revised benchmarks as set out in the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council of 2 July 2015, and *agrees* with the Secretary-General that progress towards the further degradation of Al-Shabaab's capacity to launch attacks, in parallel with improving the capacity of Somali forces to progressively sustain control of areas recaptured from Al-Shabaab allowing the return of State authority, can enable a gradual reduction of AMISOM's role in Somalia, and allow a transition to a role of oversight and rapid response in support of the Somali security forces;

23. *Requests* that the AU, taking into account progress achieved in offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other terrorist organisations, by gradually, and in a limited manner, and where appropriate, reconfigure AMISOM uniformed personnel in favour of police personnel within the authorized AMISOM personnel ceiling, and provide updates on the reconfiguration as appropriate through the Secretary-General;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the African Union, to conduct a joint assessment mission of AMISOM, after the 2016 electoral process, to ensure that AMISOM is properly configured to support the next phase of state-building in Somalia, and to present options and recommendations to the Security Council by 15 April 2017;

25. *Stresses* the importance of the FGS accelerating the strengthening and improved coordination of the Somali security institutions, and enhancing efforts to move towards the eventual handover of security responsibilities to the Somali security services, including through the establishment of a forum between the FGS, AU and United Nations to specifically plan for, and regularly monitor, the handover of security responsibilities, which is an essential part of AMISOM's eventual exit strategy, and *requests* regular updates on this trilateral coordination through the Secretary-General;

Somali Security Forces

26. *Calls for* the rapid implementation of the National Security Policy, and the federal policing model, and expeditious agreement on a Somali federal security sector architecture, which clearly defines the roles, responsibilities and structures of

relevant security sector institutions as a way of improving coordination between AMISOM and the Somali security forces and ensuring coherence and sustainability of international assistance by UNSOM;

27. *Underscores* the importance of bilateral partners delivering on any pledged support as well as supporting UNSOM in implementing its mandate to assist the FGS in coordinating international donor support on security sector assistance, and in this regard *emphasizes* the importance of UNSOM's mandate to assist the FGS in coordinating international donor support on security sector assistance;

28. *Welcomes* the support already provided by the international community and bilateral donors to the Somali security sector, *encourages* partners to further enhance their support to the FGS for the development of the Somali security sector and *calls upon* new partners to come forward to support this development, and *reiterates* the importance of coordination amongst all partners;

29. *Underlines* that it is essential that military operations are followed immediately by national efforts to establish or improve governance structures in recovered areas and by the delivery of basic services, including security;

30. *Welcomes* the commitment of the FGS and emerging Federal states to establish basic policing services across Somalia, as envisaged in the new federal policing model, *encourages* donors to support the FGS in its implementation, and *welcomes* capacity-building for the maritime police force in line with resolution 2246 (2015) by the FGS with the support of UNSOM, and *looks forward* to progress towards its implementation;

31. *Takes note* of the Secretary-General's examination in his letter of 7 October 2015 (S/2015/762) of the concept and feasibility of the options available for entities to provide logistics support to the Puntland forces that are to be integrated into the SNA, *further notes* that such support to the SNA in Puntland be provided by a United Nations entity other than UNSOS, and *welcomes* the intention to continue to work towards identifying the best mechanism;

Logistical Support

32. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM and 70 AMISOM civilians, the SNA on joint operations with AMISOM, and UNSOM, as set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2245 and *requests* the Secretary-General to expedite the necessary procedures to implement resolution 2245;

33. *Requests* the AU, the United Nations and troop-contributing countries to jointly determine the equipment requirements for AMISOM and to conclude negotiations on the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) without delay, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report on the status of the tripartite MOUs in his regular reporting;

Somalia

34. *Welcomes* President Hassan Sheikh's and the FGS's commitment to an inclusive and credible electoral process in 2016 and underlines the Council's expectation that there should not be an extension of electoral process timelines for

either the executive or legislative branches, *underlines* the importance of implementing the electoral process set out in the 22 May 2016 Presidential decree without further delay, *calls on* all parties to engage constructively to achieve this and *emphasizes* that this year's electoral process is a critical step towards one person one vote elections in 2020 and in this regard *urges* the National Leadership Forum to adopt a roadmap to the 2020 elections;

35. *Underlines* the need to ensure progress in the constitutional review process without further delay in order to establish an effective federal political system and a comprehensive reconciliation process that brings about national cohesion and integration, and *underlines* in this regard the importance of supporting the peaceful and inclusive completion of the state formation process and providing effective mediation when necessary and *encourages* close dialogue between the FGS, regional administrations, civil society and the Somali public in this regard;

36. *Calls on* President Hassan Sheikh and the FGS to implement commitments to security sector reform, including on increasing the transparency and accountability of security sector financial management, and to deliver early implementation of the endorsed national security policy, resulting in a clear, sustainable and agreed architecture of security sector institutions, *urges* the President and FGS to undertake this comprehensive security sector reform as soon as possible, including by providing timely, regular and predictable payment of stipends for the SNA, and *underlines* in this regard the need to ensure full and regular consultation with, and support from, all Federal states and Interim Regional Administrations;

37. *Welcomes* the FGS' active engagement with the Universal Periodic Review Process and encourages implementation by states of all accepted recommendations;

38. *Expresses* concern at continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia and *underscores* the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those responsible for such violations and abuses, *welcomes* the recent passage of legislation to establish Somalia's National Human Rights Commission, *encourages* its rapid formation and *further encourages* the FGS to pass legislation aimed at protecting human rights and ensuring investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of crimes involving violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations and abuses;

39. *Expresses* concern at the increase in forced evictions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from public and private infrastructure in major towns in Somalia, *stresses* that any eviction should be consistent with relevant national and international frameworks, *calls upon* the FGS and all relevant actors to strive to provide concrete durable solutions for internal displacement, and *encourages* the FGS, with the support of partners, to create an environment conducive to the voluntary repatriation of refugees, and the voluntary, safe and dignified return, local integration or resettlement of IDPs;

40. *Expresses* concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Somalia and its impact on the people of Somalia, *commends* the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian actors to deliver life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, *condemns* the increase in attacks against

humanitarian workers and calls on all parties to respect and protect humanitarian personnel, facilities and assets; further *condemns* any misuse or obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia; *underlines* the importance of proper accounting in international humanitarian support, and *encourages* national disaster management agencies in Somalia to scale up capacity with support from the United Nations to take a stronger leadership role in coordination of humanitarian response;

41. *Underlines* the importance of respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions, by all actors in Somalia;

42. *Reaffirms* the important role of women and youth in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, *stresses* the importance of their participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, *recalls* in this regard Security Council resolution 2242 (2015), *notes* that women are not adequately represented in the assemblies of the new interim regional administrations and *urges* the FGS and Interim Regional Administrations to continue to promote increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in Somali institutions, including meeting the agreed 30 per cent quota for women in both houses of the Federal Parliament in the 2016 electoral process, and *encourages* UNSOM to enhance its interaction across Somali civil society, including women, youth, and religious leaders in order to ensure that the views of civil society are incorporated in the various political processes;

43. *Welcomes* Somalia's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and *calls* for increased implementation of the two Action Plans signed in 2012 and strengthening of the legal framework for the protection of children, especially in light of continued abductions and unlawful recruitment and use of children in armed conflict as well as detention of children for association with armed groups as detailed in the annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict of 20 April 2016 (S/2016/360), and *encourages* the FGS to consider the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict;

Reporting

44. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of this resolution, including through oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, with the first written report by 12 September 2016, and every 120 days thereafter;

45. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex

Units to be generated:

(a) A training team of 220 troops to assist the coordination and consolidation of bilateral training on one agreed instruction doctrine and to take the lead in training, mentoring and partnering the SNA;

(b) Logistics Mission Enabling Units of 190 personnel per sector and 240 personnel at headquarters to reinforce command and control as well as to upgrade linkages between sector commands and AMISOM Headquarters in line with the expansion of operations;

(c) An engineering unit of 190 personnel;

(d) A signals unit of 117 personnel;

(e) Port Security component of 312 troops to be confined to patrols in the vicinity of key seaports and to operate jointly with Somali port security units;

(f) Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) of six personnel

(g) An aviation component of up to a maximum of 3 utility helicopters and 9 attack helicopters.

United Nations S/2016/592

Security Council

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5 July 2016

Original: English

Fourth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2233 (2015)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2233 (2015), in which I was requested to report every three months on progress made toward fulfilling the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The report covers key developments related to Iraq and provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Iraq since the issuance of my report dated 27 April 2016 (S/2016/396).

II. Summary of key political developments pertaining to Iraq

A. Political situation

2. Negotiations to overcome the political deadlock and split in the Council of Representatives persisted during the reporting period. At the same time, the Iraqi people continued their calls for tangible progress on Government reforms and the implementation of anti-corruption measures. Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, staged large protests in coordination with pro-reform and anti-corruption civil society protesters, mainly on Fridays. The dissenting members of Parliament coalesced into a new entity, named the Reform Front, which saw increased steps towards the consolidation of the group as a new political force. Reform Front members filed an appeal with the Federal Supreme Court, challenging the legality of the parliamentary session on 26 April.

3. On 20 May, thousands of protesters, including many supporters of al-Sadr, moved from Baghdad's Tahrir Square towards the Green Zone and forced their way into the Council of Ministers' secretariat building and the Office of the Prime Minister. Iraqi security forces used crowd control measures, including rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannons inside and outside the Green Zone. Live ammunition was reportedly fired into the air in an effort to disperse the crowds. UNAMI received reports of the death of four protesters and of many other casualties, including some members of the security forces.

4. The incident on 20 May was the second major breach of the Green Zone's security since 30 April, after heightened security measures had been put in place. Muqtada al-Sadr strongly criticized the Government for using force against

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protesters. The same day, the Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, stated in a televised address that the breach of the Green Zone, like recent suicide attacks in the Baghdad area, was the work of "Baathist infiltrators" and "criminals" belonging to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), to undermine the Iraqi security forces. The statement was strongly rejected by the protesters and by al-Sadr.

5. On 21 May, in Baghdad, protesters supporting Muqtada al-Sadr and a protest group called the Civil Trend side formed a joint higher coordination committee to organize their activities. Al-Sadr, who had announced that he would be outside the country as of 30 April for religious seclusion, issued statements calling for the continuation of peaceful protests and for government reforms.

6. During the second week of June, several attacks occurred on the offices of major established Shi'a political parties in southern governorates and Baghdad, which were allegedly carried out by splinter elements of the protesters (many calling themselves "revolutionist youth"). Those elements forced the temporary closure of Da'wah, Badr, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Fadila party offices, claiming that those parties were impediments to reforms. After coming under mounting criticism, on 10 June, al-Sadr called on his supporters to cease demonstrations during Ramadan, refrain from using violence and prepare for a "peaceful, popular million-man demonstration" at the end of Ramadan.

7. On 10 May, the Council of Representatives announced the resumption of its work at the committee level. The plenary, however, was deferred owing to the continued split within the Council and, in turn, the lack of a quorum. After over a month of extensive mediation efforts to bring back those sections of the Members of Parliament who had boycotted or suspended their participation for various reasons, the plenary of the Council reconvened on 29 May to express support for the Government's recent launch of an operation to retake Fallujah. Notably, the session included members of the Council of Representatives from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

8. In his address to the session, the Prime Minister stated that the differences between political blocs over the parliamentary impasse were minimal, that the Council of Representatives had an important oversight role to play and that nominations would be accepted for the leadership positions of independent commissions, ministerial undersecretaries and military leadership, as a next step. Subsequent efforts to hold a session of the Council with a full agenda failed and on 31 May, the Speaker of Parliament, Salim al-Juburi, announced that the legislative break for the Council would commence on 1 June. Since the swearing in of the new ministers of trade, oil and transport did not take place, those ministries are currently headed by acting ministers.

9. In May, and again in early June, the Federal Supreme Court indicated that it would rule on the legality of the contested 14 and 26 April sessions of the Council of Representatives only after its expert panels had examined the matter further. The appeals filed by the three ministers who were voted out of their posts during the session of the Council on 26 April remain pending.

10. Political efforts to mediate the disagreements in the Council of Representatives included those of a six-member group of parliamentary leaders whose affiliations cross party lines. The group, led by a Member of Parliament from the State of Law Coalition, Ali al-Allaq, shuttled between various political blocs in

Baghdad and Irbil. The President, Fuad Masum, also held regular meetings with key leaders and representatives of the Reform Front. The Speaker of Parliament made repeated visits to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to address the concerns of the Members of Parliament from the Kurdistan Alliance regarding their return to Baghdad, and the Prime Minister met the Alliance on 28 May. On 29 May, the majority of the members of Parliament from the Alliance participated in the parliamentary session. The political stalemate and protests dominated the national debate, and there was no significant progress on national reconciliation.

11. Iraq's economic crisis continued to adversely affect its people, notwithstanding the marginal recovery in global oil prices. On 19 May, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that it had reached an agreement with the Government of Iraq on a request for a 36-month standby arrangement. Subject to the approval of the Executive Board of IMF, it would provide Iraq with access to IMF credit amounting to approximately $5.4 billion. The funds would be made available subject to changes being effected to bring the country's economic and financial policies in line with the lower level of oil prices and ensure debt sustainability. Iraq is also expected to receive at least $3 billion from the World Bank over the course of three years, with the first tranche of $1 billion due to be disbursed in December 2016.

12. In May, the Kurdistan Regional Government officially launched a three-year reform plan, entitled "Reforming the economy for shared prosperity and protecting the vulnerable". The plan, which was drawn up with the assistance of the World Bank Group, is comprised of several pillars, such as fiscal consolidation, structural reforms for sustainable private sector-led growth, social sector reforms and mitigation measures and accountability. The conference to launch the plan, hosted by the Ministry of Planning of the Kurdistan Regional Government, was attended by the President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Masoud Barzani, and senior Kurdistan Regional Government officials, as well as representatives of the international community, including the United Nations.

13. During a meeting on 28 May with members of Parliament from the Kurdish parties on outstanding issues between Baghdad and Irbil, the Prime Minister requested that the Kurdistan Regional Government and Kurdish political parties send their respective delegations to Baghdad to resume negotiations on outstanding issues. On 7 June, all Kurdish cabinet ministers returned to Baghdad to attend meetings of the Council of Ministers.

14. On 17 May, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Gorran Movement signed a political agreement ending the split between the two organizations. Although the agreement does not stipulate a merger of the two parties, it provides for them contesting elections at the national, regional and governorate levels as a single list. Both parties also affirmed their preference for a parliamentary system of government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, with the President of the Region elected by the Regional Parliament. On 18 May, the Kurdistan Democratic Party issued a statement noting that the agreement would worsen the political situation in Kurdistan. It also criticized the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan for entering into the agreement without prior notification to the Kurdistan Democratic Party, given an earlier strategic agreement between the two parties. Political dialogue to address the outstanding differences between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan continued.

B. Security

15. During the reporting period, the Iraqi security forces, the Peshmerga, the popular mobilization forces and local fighters, with support from the international counter-ISIL coalition, continued to make progress in retaking areas from ISIL. Steady momentum in military operations was maintained, most notably in Anbar governorate, which resulted in the retaking of Hit city, Rutbah city and the recovery of territory in western Anbar, near the Walid border crossing with the Syrian Arab Republic and the Turaybil border crossing with Jordan.

16. On 22 May, the Prime Minister announced the launch of a large-scale operation to retake Fallujah from ISIL, involving all major components of Iraq's security apparatus, including the popular mobilization forces. At the time of writing, the operation had made progress despite heavy resistance from ISIL. In the boundary area between Irbil and Ninawa governorates, the Peshmerga expanded control in Makhmur district and heavy fighting is taking place south of Mosul.

17. The security situation has remained volatile across Iraq. While ISIL sustained consistent losses in resources and territory, the group increasingly resorted to asymmetric tactics, such as suicide attacks and raids on pro-Government forces' positions, as well as attacks against soft civilian targets, infrastructure and cultural heritage sites. On 3 June, ISIL damaged the Nabu Temple in Nimrud (Iraq) which was founded more than 3,300 years ago.

18. In Baghdad, which was the area most affected by terrorist incidents, there were indications of deployment by ISIL of more substantial resources to execute operations, with the use of high-yield explosive devices and complex and suicide attacks. On 11, 17 and 30 May, a series of suicide attacks were carried out in Baghdad, resulting in a large number of civilian casualties. The attacks on 11 May in Sadr city, Karak and Kazimiyah areas reportedly killed over 92 civilians and wounded over 150; the attacks on 17 May in the Sha'b, Habibiyah and Jamilah areas of Baghdad reportedly killed 53 civilians and wounded 130, and the attacks on 30 May were carried out in Tarmiyah, Sha'b and Sadr city and left 24 civilians dead and 44 wounded. On 15 May, ISIL carried out a complex suicide attack against a cooking gas factory in northern Baghdad, reportedly causing 35 casualties among Iraqi security force personnel protecting the facility and substantial damage to storage tanks. On 7 June, a car bomb attack claimed by ISIL in the Muwazzafin district of Karbala governorate reportedly killed eight civilians and wounded 18.

C. Regional and international developments

19. Iraq continued to engage its regional neighbours as well as the broader international community on security, political and economic issues. In addition, developments related to the popular demonstrations, the terrorist attacks that targeted Sadr city and other areas on 11 May and the start of the military operation to retake Fallujah prompted public expressions of support and solidarity for the Government and the people of Iraq. Public statements by Qatar, the United States of America, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the European Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, among others, highlighted concern about recent developments and called for unity, peaceful dialogue and other solutions to the various challenges faced by Iraq. In most cases,

the statements reflected pledges of various forms of support to the Government, including to the Iraqi security forces.

20. Senior-level visits to Iraq sought to underscore the regional neighbours' ongoing support to the Government of Iraq. The Minister for Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Alavi, visited Iraq in May. He met senior government, political, security and religious representatives in Baghdad, Najaf and Irbil, and reportedly discussed the fight against ISIL. In relation to the Fallujah operation and other operations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran made statements expressing Tehran's readiness to provide additional support. In response to media attention to the presence of regional military advisers involved in the Fallujah operation, on 4 June the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq stated that only the Government of Iraq would decide on the nationality of military advisers supporting its campaign against ISIL.

21. In June, the Government of Iraq dispatched three senior delegations to enhance its outreach to neighbouring States, with the aim of providing briefings on the Fallujah operation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ibrahim al-Ja'afari, and the head of the Sunni Endowment, Abdullatif al-Humayim, visited Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. The second delegation, headed by the Minister for Planning, Salman al-Jumaili, and National Security Adviser, Falah Fayyad, visited Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain, while a third delegation, headed by the Minister for Defence, Khaled al-Obeidi, went to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait.

22. Reflecting the progress made by the Iraqi security forces in retaking Anbar territory from ISIL, Iraqi federal and governorate officials issued statements welcoming the prospect of reopening the Iraqi-Jordanian border crossing at Turaybil, as well as the completion of the Amman-Baghdad highway, which would help facilitate the transfer of people and goods in both directions.

23. On the economic front, on 15 May the heads of the National Iranian Gas Company and the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran visited Iraq to finalize the financial details of an agreement on gas exports. The Islamic Republic of Iran undertook to re-initiate its exports of natural gas to the Kurdistan region of Iraq, pending the operationalization of the agreement. On 19 May, Iraq's Ministry of Electricity announced that the Government had agreed to issue a sovereign guarantee to cover Iraq's dues to the Ministry of Electricity of the Islamic Republic of Iran, amounting to approximately $700 million. The goal was to facilitate the renewal of the contract to supply up to 1,300 MW of electricity, interrupted several months earlier, which was approved by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

24. On 27 May, the Group of Seven countries held a summit in Ise-Shima, Japan, during which it committed continued support for the unity of Iraq and the Government of Iraq's efforts to accelerate political and economic reforms and enhance national reconciliation. It also supported Iraq's discussions with IMF and underscored the need for all parts of Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, to have access to that support. The Group of Seven also pledged over $3.6 billion in bilateral assistance and other financial support to complement support from the international financial institutions.

25. Turkish air strikes against Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) targets in the Kurdistan region of Iraq continued. The strikes targeted districts in Dahuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates. At the time of reporting, Iraq and Turkey had not found

a mutually acceptable solution to the Turkish military presence in Bashiqa camp in northern Iraq, in spite of some efforts.

III. Update on the activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the United Nations country team

A. Political activities

26. My Special Representative and the Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs continued to meet with Government officials, political, security, religious and community leaders, Members of Parliament, members of the coordination committee of the protesters and civil society representatives in an effort to help de-escalate and overcome the ongoing political stalemate. My Special Representative called on the Prime Minister and other leaders to hold inclusive consultations with all parties, including in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, in search of political solutions based on the Constitution, laws and principles of democracy. He further encouraged Iraqi leaders to resume the work of a unified Council of Representatives and to confirm without delay a reformed Government that is able and willing to promote reforms, answering to the people who have been requesting them through peaceful protests since August 2015.

27. Additionally, my Special Representative, while supporting peaceful demonstrations held in accordance with the law, condemned the use of violence during the recent demonstrations. He urged for calm, restraint and respect for Iraq's constitutional institutions and law and further urged the protest organizers and the security forces to safeguard the peaceful nature of the demonstrations. My Special Representative also held several meetings with the political leaders of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah, encouraging them to re-engage with the federal Government to overcome the political impasse and restart the work of the Parliament and Government. In addition, my Special Representative called for progress on outstanding issues between Baghdad and Irbil and for a solution to the ongoing political stalemate in the Kurdistan region.

28. My Special Representative had several meetings with the Marja'iya in Najaf. He met with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani on 30 May. The Marja'iya expressed its discontent over the political stalemate and ongoing lack of progress on reforms and improvement in the lives of Iraqis. The Marja'iya stated that he had urged the political forces to unite and find a solution to the political, economic and social crises, while continuing to fight ISIL. On 4 and 5 June, my Special Representative visited Amman and met with Government officials, during which he encouraged them to continue to support Iraq in its fight against ISIL and the national reconciliation efforts and to work on opening the border crossing at Turaybil.

29. In response to the security situation and terrorist attacks on civilians, particularly in May, my Special Representative engaged Government representatives and security and religious leaders, urging them, together with all segments of Iraqi society, to reject the terrorist acts of ISIL and its objective to sow discord, disunity and sectarian strife. Further, my Special Representative sought to impress on the Government the need to provide and guarantee law and order and security to all citizens and to take immediate and more effective measures to prevent acts of terror and protect the Iraqi people.

30. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq also publicly expressed concern about the decision by the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission to order the closure of the offices of Al Jazeera satellite news network in Baghdad and in doing so emphasized that, at times of crisis, a free media becomes even more essential to safeguarding the public interest and protecting democracy.

B. Electoral assistance

31. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq continued to support the Independent High Electoral Commission on preparations for the 2017 Provincial Council elections, while taking note of calls from some political forces for thorough electoral reform, and even for early elections, with more direct United Nations involvement. UNAMI maintained regular consultations with the Board of Commissioners of the Independent High Electoral Commission regarding orderly electoral preparations, including on United Nations support and political developments in Iraq relevant to the work of the Commission. UNAMI helped the Commission follow up with potential donors on the project proposals previously submitted for international funding, with several donors expressing interest in supporting projects relating to gender issues, information technology and work on ensuring the electoral participation of voters displaced by conflict.

32. UNAMI continued to provide technical advice as the Commission commenced its analysis of voters' biometric data and to define mechanisms for cleaning the voter registry, including the addition of new voters to, and the removal of deceased persons from, the list of voters. UNAMI projects that the biometric data of up to 5.6 million voters will be collected by the close of the registration process, on 30 June. The Commission also expanded its ongoing biometric registration of internally displaced voters, with 113 mobile teams deployed in 16 governorates, not including Anbar and Ninawa. UNAMI is also supporting the Commission on ways to improve its election results management systems and has encouraged the Commission to weigh viable options in adopting new procedures and technologies for speeding up processes to count and transmit election results.

33. Following renewed requests from the Kurdistan Regional Government for United Nations electoral support, UNAMI encouraged the Independent High Electoral Commission and the Kurdistan Region's Independent High Electoral Commission to secure parliamentary endorsement of their signed joint memorandum of cooperation. Both the Legal Committee in the Council of Representatives and the Kurdistan Regional Parliament have now approved the joint memorandum that provides the necessary legal standing to strengthen cooperation and support, particularly in organizing regional elections and on potential areas of international electoral technical assistance.

C. Human rights developments and activities

34. Armed conflicts, acts of violence and terrorism continued to take a grave toll on the population of Iraq. From 6 May to 14 June 2016, UNAMI recorded a minimum of 1,953 civilian casualties (607 killed and 1,346 wounded), bringing the total number of civilian casualties in Iraq since the beginning of the armed conflict in January 2014 to at least 66,181 (22,339 killed and 43,842 wounded).

35. The reporting period was characterized by several attacks, most of them claimed by ISIL. UNAMI is not in a position to independently verify the accuracy of those claims. For example, on 9 May, a suicide car bomb attack in Ba'qubah city, Diyala governorate, reportedly killed 14 civilians and wounded 38. On 11 May, a car bomb attack in Baghdad reportedly killed 28 persons and wounded 74. On 21 May, an attack by a suicide bomber driving a motorcycle in Dujayl district, Salah al-Din governorate, reportedly killed 12 persons and wounded 33.

36. UNAMI received numerous reports alleging serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law perpetrated against civilians, in particular by ISIL. Members of diverse ethnic and religious communities, women, children, people with disabilities and the elderly remain especially vulnerable.

37. UNAMI continued to receive reports of abductions, killings and persecution by ISIL of those opposed to its ideology or rule. For example, on 12 May, in Mosul, a group of ISIL supporters shot and killed five men accused of cooperating with the Iraqi security forces. On 14 May, also in Mosul, ISIL publicly stoned to death 18 men and one woman for alleged adultery, following a decision by a self-appointed court of ISIL. Civilians continued to die or were killed by ISIL for trying to flee areas controlled by the group. For example, on 16 May, five civilians from one family, including three children, reportedly died from dehydration in the Hamrin Mountains while attempting to escape ISIL-controlled Hawijah, Kirkuk governorate, towards Salah al-Din governorate.

38. Further reports have been received that ISIL may have used weaponized chemical agents in its attacks. On 8 May, ISIL once again launched rockets toward Bashir village, south of Kirkuk city, resulting in breathing difficulty and nausea, as well as skin irritation, being suffered by those in the area. On 14 May, ISIL reportedly carried out an attack against Peshmerga forces in Makhmur district, Irbil Governorate, after which 14 Peshmerga fighters indicated they had breathing difficulty, sore eyes and headaches. UNAMI could not verify whether weaponized chemical agents were used.

39. On 9 June, the Governor of Anbar and the Provincial Council of Anbar formed a committee to investigate alleged human rights violations against civilians fleeing the hostilities in Fallujah. The committee examined the events that took place from 2 to 4 June near the Albu Akkash cemetery (Saqlawiyah city, northwest of Fallujah city) and Mazra'ah (east of Fallujah city). On 12 June, the committee reported that it had found that 49 people were killed and 634 men were missing after handing themselves over to the custody of popular mobilization forces. The committee further found that those detained suffered widespread torture. The committee called on the President of Iraq, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament to investigate further, and for the Prime Minister and the head of the Popular Mobilization Commission to terminate the work of the popular mobilization forces in areas where violations have taken place.

40. UNAMI received separate reports stating that men leaving Fallujah were detained for security screening and were subjected to serious ill-treatment. UNAMI received reports that on 5 or 6 June, up to 613 men were released from detention after undergoing security screening over an unspecified period of time in Saqlawiyah. The men claimed to have been seriously ill-treated. UNAMI received reports that between four and nine men were killed while in detention. Up to 4,000 men who fled Fallujah have reportedly been detained for security screening.

41. Reports continued to be received by UNAMI of human rights violations perpetrated by armed groups reportedly associated with the popular mobilization forces. On 10 May, an affiliated armed group allegedly stopped three trucks carrying commercial goods in an area south of Ba'qubah, Diyala governorate. The drivers were reportedly killed and the vehicles with cargo left behind. On 22 May, armed men reportedly shot and killed a civilian in Miqdadiyah district, Diyala governorate.

42. Air strikes and shelling continued to cause civilian casualties. However, UNAMI was unable to verify their numbers and their authors. For example, on 13, 16 and 18 May, shelling reportedly caused civilian casualties in Khalidiyah, Anbar governorate. Several reports were also received of shelling reportedly killing and wounding civilians in Fallujah, Anbar governorate during the reporting period. On 19 May, an air strike reportedly hit a residential area in Fallujah, killing eight civilians (including four women and three children) and wounding nine others.

43. The Government of Iraq continued to impose the death penalty. On 23 May, the Ministry of Justice announced on its website that 22 individuals had been executed in the previous month. They had reportedly been convicted of terrorism-related crimes and other crimes. The United Nations has repeatedly called on the Government of Iraq to impose a moratorium on all death sentences and executions, particularly given the weaknesses of the Iraqi criminal justice system and the risk of non-compliance with international standards of due process and fair trial.

44. The Task Force on Children and Armed Conflict, co-chaired by UNAMI and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), received reports of 47 incidents of violations against children in the reporting period, affecting 220 children. The majority of those incidents were reported to have taken place in Baghdad, as well as in Anbar and Ninawa governorates, in the course of military operations. Only 38 of those incidents, affecting 75 children, could be verified at the time of writing, as a result of ongoing military operations.

45. Killing and maiming continued to be one of the most reported violations, with 55 children confirmed killed and 16 maimed. The number of killed and injured children is believed to be much higher as a result of the bomb attacks in Baghdad. The Task Force has also received reports of the recruitment of children by ISIL, notably in Anbar governorate, including cases of child suicide bombers, which could not be verified due to lack of access and sensitivity of cases. The Task Force received information about four incidents of attacks on schools and three attacks on hospitals during the reporting period. In addition, access to basic services, such as education and health care, continued to be severely hampered by military operations in conflict-affected areas, notably in Anbar.

46. On 24 May, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) launched an online awareness-building and mobilization campaign called "We are here". Its aim is to inspire women activists from Iraq and the region to share their stories with the world and document their roles in building their countries. The social media campaign seeks inspirational stories in the form of tweets, captions, photos and videos of women from across the region as they participate in building and furthering the political and social fabric of their nations.

D. Camp Hurriya

47. The United Nations continued to monitor the humanitarian situation of the residents of Camp Hurriya throughout the reporting period. The total departures as at 14 June 2016 stood at 1,493 and the total number of registered residents remaining in the temporary transit location stood at 1,578. Following an international agreement, funds have been mobilized to relocate the remaining residents. The Department of Political Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other stakeholders are working closely together to relocate all individuals outside Iraq within 2016. In the time period of the present report, approximately 40 residents of the camp departed per week. An increase in weekly departures is anticipated at the end of June.

E. Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development

48. The humanitarian operation remains one of the largest and most complex in the world. Humanitarian partners estimate that over 10 million Iraqis currently require some form of humanitarian assistance, including over 3.3 million internally displaced persons, 726,000 returnees, 250,000 Syrian refugees and the 3 million people believed to be living under ISIL control. In the months ahead, as the military campaign intensifies, humanitarian needs are projected to increase significantly. More than 470,000 people living in areas along the Anbar corridor and 830,000 along the Mosul corridor are likely to require assistance; more than 1 million people are expected to be affected by military operations in Mosul city.

49. The United Nations is deeply worried about the safety of the thousands of women, men, girls and boys who are still trapped in Fallujah. Since the beginning of the military operations to retake the city, more than 43,000 civilians have managed to flee the city. Most people have fled to outlying areas. The United Nations does not know how many civilians are still in the city, but as many as 40,000 to 50,000 could be at extreme risk from artillery and cross-fire and could be suffering from widespread food shortages, lack of medicine and limited supplies of safe drinking water. Humanitarian partners have had no access to Fallujah since early 2014, when the city fell to ISIL. Support for families displaced from the city is being provided at several locations, where life-saving supplies have been pre-positioned and where the Government has established camps. Such assistance included ready-to-eat food, safe drinking water and hygiene kits in Fallujah district, benefiting about 5,500 people. In Amiriyat al-Fallujah, where most displaced people from Fallujah arrived, United Nations partners provided 3,000 people with immediate response rations, each of which feeds a family of 5 for three days.

50. There is grave concern about the close to 30,000 people who are estimated to be living between the current military front line and the eastern bank of the Tigris River and the hundreds of thousands of civilians who remain trapped in areas effectively under siege, who lack access to regular humanitarian assistance. At least 620 people, including 250 children, have been stranded between military front lines east of Mount Sinjar in Ninawa governorate since November 2015.

51. During the reporting period, humanitarian partners have continued to provide life-saving assistance, reaching more than 2 million highly vulnerable people each month. New humanitarian operations have been launched in several hard-to-reach

areas, including Ramadi, Hit and Mahkmur district. The rapid response mechanism, managed by UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP), in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund and a consortium of non-governmental organization partners, has distributed thousands of ready-to-eat food rations, bottled water and hygiene kits. The World Health Organization, UNICEF and the Iraqi Ministry of Health have reached more than 5.5 million children under the age of five through nationwide polio campaigns.

52. As the mine action subcluster lead, the United Nations Mine Action Service coordinated activities to raise awareness about improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance, in areas with large concentrations of displaced families and returnees originating from Anbar. In June, mine action partners launched risk awareness campaigns with local media and training of trainer initiatives with schoolteachers and community focal points within camps for internally displaced persons.

53. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and other education partners have scaled-up temporary learning spaces to support children outside the formal education system. Hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis and Syrian refugees have received water and sanitation services. New camps were built by UNHCR and prefabricated shelters built by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) are supporting internally displaced persons in Baghdad, Dahuk and Karbala governorates.

54. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations distributed vegetable seeds and peat moss to thousands of crisis-affected farmers in Anbar and Salah al-Din governorates, to help communities minimize negative coping mechanisms. During the reporting period, partners worked alongside WFP to assist 270,000 internally displaced persons with food vouchers and targeted over 800,000 internally displaced persons with in-kind assistance. In addition, close to 50,000 food-insecure Syrian refugees in the Kurdistan region of Iraq received cash and vouchers.

55. In support of the contingency plan for the Anbar and Mosul corridors and for Mosul city, the humanitarian pooled fund for Iraq has given priority to partners operating in hard-to-reach and underserved areas. Operational preparedness planning for a potential failure of Mosul Dam has also accelerated, in coordination between UNAMI and the Government of Iraq. A four-member United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team was deployed to Iraq and has drafted a range of protocols on issues related to tax exemptions for the import of humanitarian goods, visas for humanitarian workers, the rapid registration of non-governmental organizations and the facilitation of access for foreign medical teams.

56. According to data collected by the International Organization for Migration, more than 726,000 displaced people have returned to their areas of origin. More than 40 per cent returned to Salah al-Din governorate, in part because of the stability corridor from Dawr to Tikrit created with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization. A total of 18 per cent of returnees have returned to Ninawa, 18 per cent to Diyala and 16 per cent to Anbar, including an estimated 100,000 returnees to Ramadi.

57. With more areas retaken from ISIL, the demand for stabilization assistance increased significantly. The Steering Committee for the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization, currently supported by 20 donors, approved support for

17 Iraqi cities. The Funding Facility concluded activities in Tikrit, Dawr, Mukayshifah and Rabiah and it is currently operational in Sa'diyah, Ramadi, Sinuni and Sinjar. Once security clearances are granted, it will launch activities in Baji, Hit, Haditha, Rutbah and Garma and, once they have been retaken, will launch similar activities in Fallujah, Sharqat, Hadar and Qayyarah.

58. In anticipation of operations to retake Mosul, the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization has been prepositioning equipment to help ensure the timely provision of stabilization assistance once conditions permit. A preliminary list of high priority projects has been identified for a new expanded stabilization channel, which will generate a large number of jobs and consolidate corridors between stabilized cities. The international counter-ISIL coalition held the quarterly meeting of its stabilization working group in Berlin on 27 May, co-chaired by the United Arab Emirates and Germany. The objective of the meeting was to discuss strategic developments and the direction of stabilization efforts in newly-liberated areas. Representing the United Nations in Iraq, my Deputy Special Representative and Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator provided an update on the status of the Funding Facility and the expanded facility, and stressed the critical need to increase funding for humanitarian operations, stabilization and clearance of unexploded ordnance. Working Group members reflected on progress in newly-liberated areas but expressed concern that military gains might be at risk if stabilization does not keep pace.

59. Stabilization efforts in Ramadi have been affected by severe unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices contamination. Clearance operations were accelerated in the city with support from the Mine Action Service. The latter's assistance also included an impact assessment to identify improvised explosive devices threats and training on explosive hazard threat mitigation. During the reporting period, the security conditions in Sinjar district and Sa'diya town improved, allowing the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization to commence stabilization activities.

60. The United Nations country team continued to support the Government's reform agenda. UNDP deployed technical experts to Baghdad in April and May to assist the Government with its planned reform of customs and strengthening of anti-corruption institutions. UNESCO assisted the Government with its reform of the technical and vocational education and training sector. At the time of writing, over 600,000 young people had enrolled in technical and vocational education and training institutions.

61. Building on the innovative Vision 2020 Joint Programme Facility Fund, a new funding facility for reform was developed to support the Kurdistan Regional Government reform agenda. The funding facility is for the mobilization of international expertise to help accelerate the implementation of the Kurdistan Regional Government-World Bank reform plan, which was launched in May (see para. 12). UN-Habitat has assisted the Kurdistan Regional Government in developing legislation to regularize informal settlements. It also assisted the Regional Government in developing new building codes and advised the Regional Government on simplifying building permit procedures, so as to help ensure new constructions meet international standards on climate change mitigation and environmental protection.

F. Security and operational issues

62. United Nations personnel in Iraq continued to work in a high-risk security environment and implement programmes and activities based on programme criticality. The demands on the United Nations for stabilization and humanitarian assistance continued to increase as areas were retaken from ISIL control. ISIL has also increasingly employed asymmetrical warfare by attacking civilian targets across Iraq, including Baghdad. The United Nations personnel's vulnerability and risk exposure while implementing its programmes remained high.

63. Some of the demonstrations described earlier in the present report took place in close proximity to UNAMI compounds in Baghdad. The Green Zone was breached by a large number of protesters, for the second time, on 20 May, with violent confrontations between the protesters and Iraqi security forces. The United Nations security management system continued to cooperate with relevant Iraqi Government security agencies as part of the ongoing efforts to mitigate the risk implied by such events for staff safety and security.

64. Over a decade after the Mission deployed, the dialogue between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations to conclude a status-of-mission agreement is still ongoing. In February 2016, the Government sent new proposals to the United Nations to resolve outstanding issues, to which the Organization has responded. The United Nations looks forward to resolving the issue.

65. Safe and secure accommodation in Baghdad for international United Nations staff continues to be limited. In addition to the existing 185 accommodation units in the D-2 compound, 99 more units are planned for construction in the upcoming year. Ten units were completed by mid-June 2016, 10 are projected to be completed by September 2016 and the remaining 79 by the end of June 2017. Another 37 accommodation units are being built in the old Tamimi compound and will be completed by the end of October, to address the immediate needs of the country team. Additional accommodation is required as stabilization assistance activities expand. Due to the deterioration in the security situation, a helicopter was deployed to Baghdad on 12 May to provide capacity to evacuate staff from the Green Zone to Baghdad International Airport for onward evacuation, if necessary.

VI. Observations

66. I call on all Iraqi political forces to come together and end the ongoing political deadlock, which negatively affects the work of the Government and the Parliament, at a time when multiplying challenges threaten the nation and its people, who so valiantly fight ISIL. It is essential to resume the work of the unified Council of Representatives soon after Ramadan, based on inclusive consultations, including between Baghdad and Irbil. A reformed Government that is able and willing to proceed with genuine political, economic and social reforms, as called for by the Iraqi people, should be established soon. In order to succeed, inclusive representation on the basis of equal rights and justice for all Iraq's diverse components, including women, youth and minority communities, is essential.

67. The continued efforts of the Prime Minister to pursue much-needed reforms in Iraq, in full consultation and cooperation with all political forces, civil society and protesters, are commendable. All elements of Iraq's political and civil society

spectrum should feel that their contribution is heard and factored into such initiatives. It is important that the Government and all political actors be open to hearing the legitimate demands of the Iraqi people for meaningful and genuine reforms, protect their right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and ensure their safety in the exercise of those rights. At the same time, the demonstrators have the responsibility of abiding by the law and maintaining the peaceful character of the protests as a means of legitimate democratic expression. Any destructive or violent behaviour merely undermines the interests of the people and diverts attention and resources away from the fight against ISIL.

68. I reiterate my call upon political leaders in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to reconcile their differences through dialogue and agree to resolve the political stalemate and normalize the function of the Kurdistan Regional Parliament expeditiously, as the Regional Parliament has not convened sessions since October 2015. The regional legislative institution is an embodiment of multiparty democracy in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. There is a pressing need for the federal Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government to constructively reengage in order to reach an understanding on oil exports and revenue-sharing, on Peshmerga salaries and on other outstanding issues, and to effectively work together to confront the shared challenges of today and tomorrow, once all areas have been retaken from ISIL.

69. National and local leaders should foster relations within and across their communities to find ways to ensure Iraq's lasting stability. The foundations of such stability require reconciliation at the political, communal and tribal levels. In the wake of successes in the joint fight against ISIL, it is time to take serious steps towards national reconciliation and historic compromise. The United Nations stands ready to assist.

70. I condemn in the strongest possible terms the heinous terrorist attacks on civilians and on public places and the destruction of cultural heritage sites committed by ISIL. Such acts of terrorist violence are contrary to all principles of decency and humanity. These barbaric attacks are cowardly attempts to stoke retaliatory acts, and I call on all Iraqis to resist such manipulation and avoid falling into the trap of ISIL terrorists. The continued killings, kidnappings, rape and torture of Iraqis, notably of minorities, by ISIL cannot be allowed to continue. These acts may constitute crimes against humanity, war crimes and even genocide.

71. Guaranteeing law and order and security to all citizens must be a top priority of State institutions and must remain their prerogative. This is notably a concern in areas with mixed ethnic and religious communities and other areas retaken from ISIL, as is the security and well-being of the population in those areas. That population includes the many internally displaced persons, who are eager to return to their places of origin voluntarily, in safety and dignity, but who have not been able or allowed to do so. The relevant authorities must do their utmost to ensure and guarantee conditions for such returns and to bring the perpetrators of acts that stand in the way of such returns, including killing, hostage-taking, extortion and other criminal acts. to justice. I congratulate the Iraqi security forces, the Peshmerga, the popular mobilization forces and local volunteers on their continuous military momentum and victories against ISIL, most notably in Anbar and Ninawa governorates. That momentum demonstrates that terrorism can be defeated through coordination and collaboration in the pursuit of shared goals.

72. The military operation, along with the participation of local volunteers and tribes to retake Fallujah, could unite the people in the hope that the flames of sectarianism are put out. The realization of that goal would require that the people and Iraqi political forces work together towards achieving a much-needed national reconciliation. Only then will the ground be sown for a truly sustainable, unified Iraq.

73. All parties involved in military operations are strongly urged to make every possible effort to protect the lives of civilians and preserve infrastructure in accordance with the relevant principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. I call on all parties to ensure that civilians, including those in Fallujah, are permitted to leave areas where fighting is taking place, in dignity and safety. In that regard, the recent directives of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Defence and the Popular Mobilization Commission, and in particular the statement of the spiritual leader Ali al-Sistani, which all emphasize the need to ensure the protection of civilians and property from the effects of armed conflict and violence, are commendable.

74. The Government should thoroughly investigate reports of alleged human rights violations against civilians in Fallujah and hold those found to be responsible to account. The people of Fallujah have already suffered immensely under ISIL; they should not be subjected to further suffering and intimidation. The noble cause of ridding Fallujah of ISIL terrorists should not be tarnished by violations of human rights and people's dignity, including on sectarian or criminal grounds. It is therefore important that the Government has command and control of all fighters and weapons. It is also the responsibility of national, regional and international media to ensure that a balanced and true picture of the complex situation in Iraq be presented and to prevent reporting from being instrumentalized to foment sectarian tension.

75. The international community must also ensure the accountability of members of ISIL for the crimes they have perpetrated against the Iraqi people. I continue to have grave fears for the safety of women and children, mostly from the Yazidi community (as reflected in previous reports), who are being held in captivity by ISIL, and all civilians who remain subject to ISIL control. Ongoing allegations of the use of weaponized chemicals by ISIL in attacks on civilians and security force personnel also remain a source of great concern.

76. The humanitarian aid effort continues to be hampered by limited funding. The United Nations highly prioritized appeal for 2016 has received only 30 per cent of the $861 million needed to assist 7.3 million people. Already more than 30 health programmes have had to be closed, owing to lack of funding. Humanitarian partners estimate that $300 million is needed by July in order to continue first-line emergency response. An additional $65 million is needed for the Fallujah operation and at least $250 million is required to prepare for the humanitarian operation in Mosul.

77. Additional focus and funding is required for civilian activities that are critical to secure the gains of the military campaign against ISIL. As the campaign progresses, it creates additional humanitarian need. Areas retaken from ISIL will frequently require a stabilization response following an operation and in that regard, the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization has been authorized for use in 17 different areas across four governorates. Furthermore, both humanitarian and stabilization activities increasingly require initiatives to address remnant improvised explosive devices and other explosive remnants of war where they are present, which is increasingly the case. The United Nations in Iraq is facing funding constraints on all of these fronts.

If resources are not marshalled for all the above-mentioned efforts, the gains of the military campaign could be imperilled by a lack of capacity to address the needs of civilians, created by and in the aftermath of the campaign. Finally, while acknowledging the importance of these urgent and immediate matters, the United Nations in Iraq continues to work in parallel with partners to focus on longer-term challenges.

78. I wish to extend my appreciation to my Special Representative, Ján Kubiš, and to the staff of the United Nations in Iraq for their tireless efforts to assist the Government and people of Iraq. I trust that international partners, including Iraq's neighbours in the region, will continue to support my Special Representative in the implementation of his mandate.

United Nations S/2016/593

Security Council

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Identical letters dated 5 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing once again to inform you of the dangerous and destabilizing behaviour of Iran and of its continuous support and funding of its proxy Hezbollah.

A decade has passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 (2006). And yet, Hezbollah, an internationally recognized terror group, continues its military build-up in violation of the aforementioned resolution. These flagrant violations are supported and funded by Iran, Hezbollah's main benefactor.

The evidence of these violations is mounting each day. While in the past Hezbollah made an effort to hide its illegal activities, today they're openly declared and are overwhelmingly apparent. On 24 June, Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, admitted in an interview that "Hezbollah's budget and its expenses are coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran ... Our allocated money is coming to us in the same way we receive our rockets with which we threaten Israel".

Just a week after this statement, Brigadier General Hossein Salami, the second-in-command of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), boasted "Today, only in Lebanon, more than 100,000 Qaem missiles are ready for launch ... these missiles would come down on the heart of the Zionist regime and be the prelude for a big collapse in the modern era".

Not only do Iranian and Hezbollah officials proudly, and publicly, describe Iran's ongoing activities, which are in clear violation of resolutions 2231 (2015), 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004), but they continue to openly issue violent threats against the State of Israel.

As the threat posed by Iran and its proxy Hezbollah is growing every day, it is clear that turning a blind eye is not an option. It is imperative that the Council act now to put an end to the flow of illicit arms to Hezbollah.

The Security Council must strongly condemn Iran for its destabilizing role in the region. The Council must also demand that Iran fully comply with resolutions 2231 (2015), 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004) and immediately stop transferring weapons to terrorist organizations.

Furthermore, the Council should hold the Government of Lebanon accountable for its obligation under resolution 1701 (2006).

Please recycle

Only the full implementation of these Security Council resolutions can ensure security and stability in the Middle East.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative